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NOTES
The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, of 19741 is
the first major change in federal regulation of futures markets since
1936.2 The Act attempts to fill the need for federal regulation created
by the enormous growth in size and importance of the futures markets. Its central feature is the creation of an independent commission to monitor the 500 billion dollars per year futures trading
markets.8
The Act does not resolve all of the important issues raised in the
recent congressional hearings on futures markets. Instead, the Congress explicitly chose to leave the resolution of several controversial
issues to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission).4 On the surface, this delegation of authority to the Commission
seems sound. There is a danger, however, that the Commission's hearings, like those of the Congress, will attract primarily those with vested
interests in particular solutions. The Commission must take affirmative action to seek out diverse views, and, if necessary, undertake its
own investigations; othenvise its decisions will necessarily be based
on the same industry information that was presented to Congress.
This would frustrate the avowed purpose of the Act to create a
federal apparatus that can weigh all interests objectively.'1
After a brief look at the functions of futures markets, the conditions that led to the enactment of the Commodity Futures
.Trading Commission Act, and the major provisions of the Act, this
note will critically examine the information now available on the
major issues left to the Commission to decide, point to additional
information that would be useful in making judgments on these
issues, and recommend solutions. It will then discuss two problems not considered in the 1974 legislation-export controls and
margin oversight-suggesting areas for action by the Commission.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389.
2. In 1936 the original federal legislation regulating commodity futures, the Grain
Futures Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998, was significantly strengthened
by amendments, and renamed the Commodity Exchange Act. Pub. L. No. 76-675, 49
Stat. 1491.
3. See 120 CONG. Rile. Hl0,247 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974); 120 CoNG. R.Ec. SIS,864
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974).
4. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 93--463, §§ 203, 208, 402(b), 414, 416, 88 Stat. 1396, 1400-01,
1412, 1414-15.
5. 120 CONG. R.Ec. SlS,864 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974).

[710]

Notes

711

I. FUNCTIONS OF FUTURES MARKETS
A futures contract6 is a standardized agreement to purchase or sell
a fixed amount of a commodity7 of a certain grade8 at a certain
future date9 for a variable price.10 Several delivery months are established for each type of future traded.11 The number of commodities
in which contracts are traded has increased steadily.12 The 1974 Act
6. For an excellent discussion of the nature of a futures contract, see R. TEWELES,
C. HARr.ow & H. STONE, THE COMMODITY FUTURES GAME 22-24 (1974).
7. The term "commodity'' will be used here to signify all of the commodities
named in the 1974 Act, and all other goods, articles, services, rights, and interests in
which futures contracts ~ presently or may in the future be traded.
8. The contract specifies a certain basis grade. The seller may choose to deliver
a grade other than the basis grade. If he does, the quoted price will be adjusted by
either a premium or a discount. J. BAER &: 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND
FUTURES TRADING 135 (1949).
9. Contracts on the physical market, generally known as the cash market, may
also provides simply for future delivery. Futures trading on the physical market, however, contemplates actual delivery of a specific lot and grade of some commodity, usually on a definite date. G. HOFFMAN, FUTURES TRADING Ul'ON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKEi'$ IN THE UNITED STATES 104-10 (1932).
IO. See Com Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 n.1 (1955). One
writer has pointed to five distinctive features of a futures contract. First, the specific
provisions of each contract are determined by the rules of an exchange and are only
briefly referred to in the actual agreement between the parties. Second, the contract is
a "basis contract," which allows delivery of either the "contract grade" or some other
grade, at the seller's option but at different prices. Third, the seller is given the
option of making delivery at any date between specified limits. Fourth, the enforcement of the contract is ensured by a provision that a specified amount, known as a
margin, shall be deposited with some _third party by each of the contracting parties.
These deposits are intended to protect the seller against a refusal of the buyer to
make good his contract in case of a fall in prices, and, conversely, to protect the
buyer against a default on the seller's part in case of a rise in prices. Fifth, delivery
is made by tendering warehouse receipts from an approved warehouse. C. HARDY,
RisK AND RlsK-BEARING 204-05 (2d ed. 1931).
U. Delivery may be made at the seller's option on any day of the delivery month.
J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 141. The delivery must be made from an ap•
proved storage facility. Id. at 142. There are three bases for the selection of months:
natural (by climate, annual harvest, or production schedule), concentration of trading
volume, and inertia. T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 37 (1971).
12. At least 56 new contracts were established by American commodity exchanges
between 1960 and 1970, ranging from futures in frozen concentrated orange juice to
futures in propane gas. See Sandor, Innovation by an Exchange: A Case Study of the
Development of the Plywood Futures Contract, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 119, 122-23 (1973).
Following the legalization of the holding of gold by private American citizens, four
major American commodity exchanges began trading in gold futures contracts, with
varying contract units. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 6, at 2, col. 3 (late city ed.).
There has been serious dispute as to what goods, services, or other tangible or
intangible things should be traded on futures markets. See Sandor, supra, at 125-26.
See also J. BAER & O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 110-25; Bakken, Futures TradingOrigin, Development and Economic Status, in 3 FUTURES TRADING SEMINAR: A CoMMODITY MARKETING FORUM FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS OF ECONOMICS (E. Gaumnitz ed.
1966) [hereinafter FUTURES TRADING SEMINAR]; Houthakker, The Scope and Limits of
Futures Trading, in THE Au.oCATION OF ECONOMIC R.EsoURCES 134 (1959); Powers,
Effects of Contract Provisions on the Success of a Futures Contract, 49 J. FARM EcoN.
833 (1967). Some recently have taken the view that anything that fluctuates in price
may properly be the subject of a futures contract. lntervi~IT with Shirley Z. Johnson,
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extends regulatory authority to any goods and articles and all
services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery
are traded now or will be traded in the future. 13
Futures contracts may be settled either by delivery of the actual
good or by making an offsetting transaction any time before the
delivery date. If delivery is made and taken, title passes and the
buyers and sellers liquidate their positions.14 In practice, however,
about ninety-nine per cent of futures contracts are settled by offsetting transactions,15 in which the holder of a contract to sell liquidates his position by purchasing a contract to buy the same commodity, or the holder of a contract to buy cancels his position by
acquiring a contract to sell. To illustrate, if a trader who has already bought five October soybeans futures contracts sells five
October soybeans futures contracts before October, the second transaction is matched against the first and the value difference between
the two contracts is settled.16
Futures contracts are bought and sold on exchanges.17 Trading at
Assistant Counsel, Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm., Washington, D.C.,
August 16, 1974 (memorandum of interview on file with the Michigan Law Review)
[hereinafter Johnson Interview].
13. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 20l(b), 88 Stat. 1395.
14. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 38; Campbell, Trading on Futures Under
the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO, WASH, L REv. 215, 217 (1958).
15. United States v. New York Coffee &: Sugar Exch., 263 U.S. 611, 616 (1924);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1924); J. BAER&: O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 138;
G. HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING AND THE CASH-GRAIN MARKETS 7 (U.S. Dept. of Agri•
culture Circular No. 201, 1932); Hoffman, Governmental Regulation of Exchanges,
ANNAI.5 OF THE .AM. ACAD. OF PoL. &: Soc. SCI., May 1931, pt. 1, at 43-48; Invin, Legal
Status of Trading in Futures, 32 !LL. L. R.Ev. 155, 156-57 (1937); Taylor, Trading in
Commodity Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63, 89 (1933).
16. As a further example, suppose A buys 1000 bushels of wheat in January for
delivery in March at $2.20 a bushel. A's broker makes the offer on an exchange and
it is accepted by B's broker, who bas an order from B to sell 1000 bushels of wheat
for March delivery. To facilitate trading, the clearing house now becomes the opposite party to both A and B. Assume that in February the price of March wheat
futures contracts has risen to $2.30 a bushel. A decides to settle his contract, and
therefore contracts on the exchange to sell 1000 bushels of March wheat to C. The
clearing house, seeing that this transaction places A. in the position of having contracted both to buy and to sell 1000 bushels of wheat for March delivery, cancels the
two contracts. Since A contracted to buy the wheat at a price 10 cents per bushel
lower than the price at which he agreed to sell, the clearing house will pay him $100.
See J. BAER &: O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 164-96; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at
39-44• .Although most futures contracts are liquidated without delivery, the fact that
deliveries can be made and taken is important in establishing and maintaining a
relationship between cash and futures prices. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen,
262 U.S. 1, 38 (1923); T. HIERONYMUS, supra, at 38-39.
17. For a general description of exchange operations, see J. BAER &: 0. SAXON,
supra note 8, at 143-64; T. HmRoNYMUs, supra note 11, at 10-27, Recently established
futures exchanges are organized under Membership Corporation Laws, while the
older exchanges were organized as corporations by special acts of state legislatures.
Id. at 266. It has been held that an exchange is essentially a voluntary association,
People v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 80 IlL 134, 137 (1875). A.ccord, Turner v. Chicago
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most exchanges is carried on in a large room or hall in which there are
usually pits for each commodity traded. Speculators deal through
futures commission merchants (FCM's), who act as intermediaries
benV"een the broker on the exchange floor and the customer.18 The
agreement between an FCM and his customer gives him limited
power of attorney for the execution of orders and imposes certain
conditions on the customer.19 A trader who has agreed to purchase
is said to be long; a trader who has agreed to sell is said to be short.20
Exchange rules usually require that information about a transaction be reported to the exchange clearing house at some time
during the day that the transaction is made. After the trade is
made on the floor, the FCM deals exclusively with a clearing member or with the clearing house, if the FCM is a clearing member.21
The clearing house is thus a party to all trades; it serves as a buyer
to all sellers and a seller to all buyers.22 Each day the clearing house
announces the settlement price from that day's trading for each
contract traded.23 This figure serves as the basis for determining
the amount to be collected or disbursed by the clearing house in
settling that day's transactions.24
One student of the exchanges has categorized traders into four
somewhat distinct groups, according to their trading functions. 25
Bd. of Trade, 244 Fed. 108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917); Thomson
v. Thomson, 293 m. 584, 127 N.E. 882 (1920).
18. A futures commission merchant (FCM) is an individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust "engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on, or subject to the rules of,
any contract market." U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRADING
IN COMMODITY FUTURES CoNTRAcrs 44 (1973).
19. For a description of the terms of agreements between brokers and customers,
see T. HmRONY.Mus, supra note 11, at 53-54. For a discussion of the legal relationship
between brokers and customers, see G. HOFF.MAN, supra note 15, at 165-66. Hieronymus identifies four general kinds of services provided to customers by brokerage
houses. First, they offer the best order execution possible, through good communications with skilled brokers on the exchange floors. Second, they act as the customer's
agent with the clearing house and prepare accounts for him of his profits and losses.
Third, they provide information for customers on market conditions and trends.
Fourth, they furnish account executives who act as a personal contact for each
customer. For a more detailed discussion, see T. HmRONY.MUS, supra, at 54-57.
20. See T. HmRONY.MUS, supra note 11, at 39-40; Campbell, supra note 14, at 21618.
21. Clearing houses reconcile all futures contracts and assure the financial integrity
of futures transactions. For a detailed discussion, see J. BAER &: 0. SAXON, supra note
8, at 164-87; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 40-44.
22. Courts have upheld the legality of the clearing system in Clews v. Jamieson,
182 U.S. 461 (1901); Daniel v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 164 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1947); and
Crowley v. Commodity Exch., 141 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1944).
23. The settlement price is based on the day's closing price or on closing price
ranges for each month of each contract. T. HmRONY.MUs, supra note 11, at 42.
24. Id.
25, Id. at 44-51. See also J. BAER &: O. SAXoN, supra note 8, at 132; G. HOFF.MAN,
supra note 15, at 133-34,
-
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Floor brokers execute the orders they receive from their outside
clients and from floor traders. 26 They are currently permitted to
trade for their mm accounts as well as for the accounts of their
customers.27 Floor traders are professional speculators who trade for
their own accounts in more than one commodity and who usually
hold a large number of contracts. Under current regulations floor
traders can also serve as floor brokers. Scalpers normally operate
only in one pit; they attempt to take advantage of small, short-term
price changes by buying at slightly lower and seeking to sell at
slightly higher than the last quoted prices. Finally, pit traders profit
from price changes that occur during the trading day, buying when
they think the price is going up and selling when they think it is
going dmm.
It is generally believed that the central function of commodities
markets is to provide a means for producers, dealers, and processors
of various commodities to ensure against large price fluctuations. 28
This process, called hedging, allows "collectors and exporters of
grain or other products, and manufacturers who make contracts in
advance for the sale of their goods, to secure themselves against the
fluctuations of the market by counter contracts, for the purchase or
sale, as the case may be, of an equal quantity of the product, or of
the material of manufacture."29 By reducing the risk of loss from
a drop in value of the commodity, hedging enables producers to sell
at lower profit margins. Middlemen require less capital and can
carry a smaller inventory when assured of predictable costs for raw
materials.3° Consumers benefit because the reduction in the pro26. A floor broker is any person "in or surrounding any pit, ring, post, or other
place provided by a contract market for the meeting of persons similarly engaged,
who shall purchase or sell for any other person any commodity for future delivery
on, or subject to the rules of any contract market." U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, supra
note 18, at 44.
27. Id.
28. See J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 197. But see Bakken, supra note 12,
at 15.
29. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 249 (1905). There
is considerable disagreement as to what precisely constitutes hedging. See, e.g., Com
Prods. Refining Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 563 (2d Cir. 1956); J. BAER & G. WOOD•
RUFF, COMMODITY ExCHANGES 83-121 (3d ed. 1935); BOARD OF TRADE OF THE Cmr OF
CmCAGO, INTRODUCTION TO HEDGING 3-13 (1972); H. EMERY, SPECULATION ON THE STOCK
AND PRODUCE ExCHANGES OF THE UNITED STATES 159-70 (1896); C. HARDY, supra note
IO, at 71, 222, 226; G. HOFFMAN, supra, note 15, at 22; G. HOFFMAN, HEDGING BY DEALING IN GRAIN FUTURES 33-93, 114, 123-24 (1925); L. HOWELL, ANALYSIS OF HEDGING AND
OTHER OPERATIONS IN GRAIN FUTURES 3 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Technical Dull. No,
971, 1948); l\!ERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, THE HEDGER'S HANDBOOK 5-10
(1971); 1 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE GRAIN TRADE 207, 210 (1920)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT]; 7 id., at 33, 53-54 (1926); Gray, The Importance of Hedging
in Futures Trading and the Effectiveness of Futures Trading for Hedging, in 1 FUTURES
TRADING SEMINAR, supra note 12, at 61-70; Hardy & Lyon, The Theory of Hedging, 51
J. POL. ECON. 276, 287 (1923).
llO. Banks encourage producers and middlemen to hedge. They will usually extend
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ducer's and middleman's operating costs lowers the price of the
finished product.81 As commodity producers and processors have
become more sophisticated, they have made increasing use of
hedging.82
Although the value of hedging is generally accepted, speculation
in futures has been sharply attacked.88 Speculators are regarded as
suspect because they generally have no actual .business use for the
physical commodities in which they purchase futures contracts.
Rather, their profit or loss is made or suffered entirely from fluctuations in futures prices. Some speculation, however, is essential to
provide the market liquidity that enables markets to accommodate
bona fide hedging transactions.84 Through the market mechanism
speculators assume the risk of price movement from hedgers. Speculators are needed to perform this function because there is often
an imbalance between the short and long hedgers. Some believe
that speculation also plays a role in stabilizing commodity prices.85
The traditional explanation is that speculators become expert at
predicting the factors that are likely to affect prices and help to
bring about more gradual price changes.86
credit for a higher percentage of the value of goods pledged as security if they have
been hedged on a futures market. J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 212; T. HIERO•
NYI\IUS, supra note 11, at 131.
31. Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of the Commodities Exchanges and
the National Securities Exchanges, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 227 (1969); Note, Federal
Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 827 (1951).
32. On the importance of hedging, see Gray, supra note 29, at 61-70. Teweles,
Harlow and Stone point out that the assumption that hedging will eliminate all
risk from price movements is naive. In practice, hedging is likely only to reduce
risks, and many hedgers are in fact engaging in some speculation by means of their
hedging position. R. T.EWELES, C. HARLOW & H. SroNE, supra note 6, at 32-43.
33. See Campbell, supra note 14, at 219 n.17. See also J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra
note 8, at 51-85; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 136-46. Speculators are prevalent
in the futures markets. A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
study of international commodities futures markets found that "much of the sharp
increase in the volume of trading since 1970-1972 has been in the form of speculation." w. l.ABYS, :MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS FOR PRIMARY COMMODITIES
1l 8 (1974) (study prepared at the request of the UNCTAD secretariat) [hereinafter
UNCTAD SruDY]. See also id. 1l 18.
34. J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 73-'75.
35. See generally A. BRACE, THE VALUE OF ORGANIZED SPECULATION 54-59 (1913);
7 FTC REPORT, supra note 29, at 16-18; Note, supra note 31, at 828. Baer and Saxon
report that in Board of Trade v. Clyne, 260 U.S. 704 (1922), 22 prominent economists
filed affidavits in which each "declared his belief that, with infrequent and minor
exceptions, futures trading had a marked tendency to stabilize prices." J. BAER &:
O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 69 n.10. See also R. TEWELES, C. HARLOW & H. SroNE,
supra note 6, at 14, 45-51. But see UNCTAD STullY, supra note 33, 1l 25.
36. Because many speculators are not experts, the validity of this theory is now
being questioned. See CoMMODITY EXCHANGE AUTHORITY, TRADING IN COMMODITY FuTURES CoNTRAcrs ON THE CmCAGO BOARD OF TRADE 8-10 (Marketing Research Report
No. 999, 1973). See also UNCTAD STullY, supra note 33, ,I1[ 26-35.
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PRESENT CONDITIONS ON FUTURES MARKETS

Congressional interest in futures markets has been spurred by
their dramatic growth in recent years.87 In 1973, a time that combined severe commodity shortages with widespread inflation, the performance of futures markets became especially controversial.38 Since
the early 1950's, there had been constant commodity surpluses and
stable domestic prices.89 In 1973, increases in world population, per
capita income, and food consumption combined with heavy inflation, dollar devaluation, and adverse weather conditions in a number
of growing areas to end the "age of surpluses."40 In this difficult
period the pressures on futures markets both to reflect accurately
the market situation and to moderate price instability were intense.41
The markets reacted with what one advisory service characterized as "mob hysteria," 42 spawning what was called "the greatest
bull market in history."43 The sudden increase in market volume
and price levels was staggering. The 25.8 million futures contracts
traded in 1973 represented a forty per cent increase over the volume
in 1972, the previous record year.44 Price levels in some contracts
soared to levels almost three times higher than their previous alltime highs.45
This major increase in price levels stimulated widespread concern about the functioning of the markets. Critics suggested that
speculators had bid up price levels, thereby exerting upward pressure on consumer prices.46 Exchange spokesmen insisted instead that
37. It is estimated that in 1960, 8.168 million futures contracts were traded, involving a total value of $54.7 billion. By 1972, this figure had increased to 47.009
million contracts, with a value of $399.3 billion. In 1973 the estimated value of
contracts traded jumped even more dramatically to $520 billion. Association of
Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc., Association Bulletins Nos. 1126, 1127, 1304. See
also Hearings on S. 2485 Before the Senate Comm. on Agrfodture and Forestry, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 540, 543-46 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Senate Hearings].
38. Compare 119 CONG. R.Ec. H8,775 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1972) and 119 CONG. R.Ec.
SIS,964 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) and Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Small Business Problems of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 47 (1973) [hereinafter House Small Business Hearings], with id. at 133, 311.
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 57, col. 5 Qate city ed.).
40. TIME, April 2, 1973, at 84-85, quoting Richard Mayer, Chicago Board of
Trade pit trader. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 89-91; N,Y,
Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 57, col. 5 Qate city ed.).
41. See generally Mollenhof, Risser 8: Anthan, The High Cost of Food Gambling,
THE NATION, June 25, 1973, at 813.
42. MONEY, Aug. 1973, at 28-29, quoting Commodity Chart Service, June 1973
Letter.
43. Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1973, at 118, quoting Houston A. Cox, Jr., National Commodities Director, Reynolds Securities, Inc.
44. Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 265 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 House Hearings].
45. See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1973, at 118.
46. See Mollenhof, Risser &: Anthan, supra note 41; N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at
47, coL 5 Qate city ed.),
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an "extraordinary coincidence of global events" was the root cause.47
The increased volatility of commodities prices caused commercial
hedgers unexpected losses,48 while it simultaneously attracted increased numbers of speculators who were encouraged by investment
houses anxious to replace their faltering securities business.49
The surge in futures prices led some to question the continued
viability of the markets.50 There was "a kind of erosion of faith in
the system by people who [had] used it for years," 51 and some
felt that the futures markets were "anachronisms on their way
to extinction." 52 In contrast, exchange offidals argued that futures
markets helped to hold down commodity price levels at a time of
extraordinary pressure, and that speculation in fact had a dampening
influence on futures price levels.53
The disparity between the critics' charges and the claims of the
exchanges led to congressional investigations. A House subcommittee investigating the speculative boom concluded that the pattern
of self-regulation by the exchanges coupled with oversight by a small
federal regulatory agency was outmoded.64 They recommended the
creation of "a Securities and Exchange Commission-type independent regulatory agency with sufficient stature to attract good personnel and more authority • . . .''55 The House Agriculture Committee found a "crisis" of public confidence in the present regulatory
scheme.66 and a special subcommittee was set up to draft a comprehensive legislative proposal.67 Several Senators also introduced
broad-ranging futures legislation.58 From the hearings and pro47. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 135.
48. In volatile markets swift price changes make it difficult to arrange a hedging
transaction before the price moves.
49. See FORBES, Aug. 1, 1978, at 24.
50. See generally Mollenhof, Risser &: Anthan, supra note 41; Hearings on the
Review of the Commodity Exchange Act Before the House Comm. on Agriculture,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings].
51. 119 CONG, REc. Sl7,'132-34 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington StarNews, Sept. 25, 1973.
52. 119 CONG. REc. S23,512-13 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973), quoting Des Moines Sunday Register, March 4, 1973, quoting Walter Groeppinger; President of the National
Com Growers Association. Other critics of futures markets stated they "serve only
as gambling casinos with farm products as the chips," N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at
58, col. I (late city ed.), while the President of the National Consumers Congress
charged that "consumers are getting the short end of the stick, because the exchanges
do nothing but serve big agri-businesses." Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1974, at 15, col. 5
(midwest ed.).
53. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 133-43, 209-15.
54. 114 CONG. REc. H8,776 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1973).
55. Id.
56. H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974).
57. 120 Cong. Rec. Hl0,247 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974). The proposal introduced
became H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
58. See S. 2837, S, 2578, S. 2485, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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posals emerged the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974.

III.

MAJOR PROVISIONS oF THE

1974 Acr

Until passage of the 1974 Act, federal regulation of futures
markets was governed by the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act. 60
Although it established a form of federal supervision over the e~changes, the 1936 Act provided little federal control over essential
exchange functions. 60 The 1974 Act finally establishes effective
federal regulatory authority; much of its strength lies in the four
provisions discussed below.
A. Independent Agency
The Act creates an independent regulatory agency-the Commodity Futures Trading Commission-headed by five commissioners
to be appointed by the President ·with the advice and consent of the
Senate.61 The Commission assumes the regulatory responsibility
currently held by a division of the Department of Agriculture, and
is intended to be more expert, more prestigious, and less susceptible
to political pressure than the old body. It should also be more
effective because its mandate extends to a wider range of goods and
services and it is better able to determine the public interest.62
The previous regulatory system within the Department of Agriculture was inadequate largely because the Department was burdened with other duties. For example, the Secretary of Agriculture
was charged with influencing the prices of many commodities.68
Since prices are supposed to fluctuate freely with supply and demand
on the commodities markets, his duty to maintain price levels created a potential conflict of interest with his duty to oversee the
markets.64 There was also a conflict between the Department's role
as an advocate for agricultural interests and its neutral position as
the supervisor of futures trading. The independence of the new
Commission should enable it to avoid such conflicts.
59. Pub. L. No. 74:-675, 49 Stat 1491.
60. See Carey, Regulation and Supervision of Futures Trading, in 3 FUTURES TRAD•
ING SEMINAR, supra note 12, at 139, 146.
61. Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 101-06, 88 Stat 1389-95. The Commissioners arc to be
full-time employees of the Commission, and they arc not to accept compensation from
any person subject to regulation by the Commission. Four of the initial Commissioners
have been nominated and confirmed. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1975, § 3 (Business and
Finance), at 1, col. 4.
62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-975, supra note 56, at 42-53; H.R. REP. No. 93-438,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40-42 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1974).
63. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-24, 1281-1393, 1421-68 (1970),
64. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 198, 417, 572, 604-05.
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Injunctive Powers
The new Commission is authorized to sue to en1om any contract market or individual from violating the Act or from restraining trading in any futures contract.65 Such authority is essential to
the effective regulation of volatile markets: If the Commission had
been required to refer requests for action to the Attorney General,
as most independent agencies must do, there would have been unnecessary delay and the Attorney General would have had virtual
veto power.66 Instead, the new Act requires the Commission only
to inform the Attorney General of its actions.
B.

C. Regulation of All Commodities
The Act provides the Commission with broad authority to regulate futures trading in all goods, articles, services, rights, and interests traded for future delivery. 67 The extension of regulatory authority to previously unregulated items should promote consistency
in exchange operations and in brokers' handling of customer accounts. It should also protect customers from fraudulent operations
on futures markets, and it provides the authority to investigate trading activity on all markets.68 The new Act should thus allow investors
to trade with confidence on all American futures markets.

D. Emergency Powers
The Act enables the Commission to take special action in
emergency situations and to direct a contract market to take measures to maintain or restore orderly trading. The term "emergency"
now includes, in addition to potential or actual market manipulations, any act of the United States or a foreign government affecting
a futures price and any other market disturbance that prevents the
market from accurately reflecting supply and demand. 69 The rapidity
with which futures markets respond to external events makes it
imperative that the Commission be able to take immediate action
in such situations.
IV.
A.

To DECIDE
Option Trading in Previously Unregulated
Futures Contracts
A commodity option is a right to buy or sell a specified quantity
of a particular commodity, or a futures contract for a particular
lsSUES LEFT TO THE COMMISSION

65. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 211, 88 Stat. 1402. It should be noted that no restraining
order, injunction, or writ of mandamus may be issued ex parte.
66. See 1974 Senate Hearfags, supra note 37, at 202-03, 209, 368, 417-18.
67. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 201, 88 Stat. 1395.
68. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-975, supra note 56, at 61-64; H.R. REP. No. 93-438,
supra note 62, at 65. It has been suggested that in the past speculators who were
prevented from manipulating regulated markets were likely to turn their attention
to unregulated markets. 197:J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 10-11.
69. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 215, 88 Stat. 1404-05.
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commodity, at a specified price within a specified period of time.70
The purchaser pays a "premium" for the option, which varies in
amount with the option's duration. 71 In addition to the premium,
the purchaser must pay one broker's fee at purchase, and another
later if the option is exercised.72 Should the option purchaser fail
to exercise his option, he loses the premium payment completely. 73
Options generally are available for periods ranging from two to
fourteen months.74
In the past three years, a new breed of commodity options, so•
called "naked options," have been sold in this country.70 Naked
options are based on changes in futures prices but are not backed
either by futures contracts or by actual ownership of the com•
modities involved. 76 Limited capital requirements and lack of regulation make entry into naked option trading easy; the potential
70. The right to buy a specified quantity of the commodity or commodity future
at a price specified in the option contract on or before a specified date is called a
"call option." The right to sell under such conditions is called a "put option." A
"double option" is a combination "put" and "call" on the same commodity. It permits
the holder to elect either to buy or to sell, but not both.
The price at which the holder of an option can buy or sell the futures contract
is generally called the "striking'' or basis price. It is normally the price at which
the futures contract is trading when the option is purchased, See S. KROLL &: I. SHISKO,
THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE 259 (1973): 1974 Senate Hearings, supra
note 37, at 825-27: Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract as a Security, 15
WM. &: MARY L. R.Ev. 212-13 (1973); Cal. Corp. Commn. Release No. 29-C, 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP. ,r 8679 (Feb. 8, 1973): DuN's, March 1973, at 72,
71. "Although the option premium is roughly equivalent to the margin requirement of a futures contract, it can run much higher, The cost goes up, for instance,
on longer-term premiums. Critics • • • also charge that some undenvriters inflate
the premiums so as to be able to offer their sales representatives handsome fees
running as high as 20% to 25% of the premium." DuN's, March 1973, at 71.
72, S. KROLL &: I, SmsKo, supra note 70, at 260, The broker's fee can be quite high,
One options house official stated that some firms were charging broker's fees as high as
12 to 15 per cent on the initial sale, and the same rate on reinvestments by the same
customers. DUN'S, March 1973, at 72,
73, As an illustration, assume that Green buys a one-year call option on a silver
contract currently worth $18,000 ($1.80 an ounce for 10,000 ounces). He pays a premium of $1000 for the option. For Green to gain a profit, the price of silver must
move up by more than 10 cents an ounce, Suppose that six months later, the price
has reached $1.95 an ounce, Green exercises his option to buy the contract for his
price of $18,000 and then sells it for its present worth of $19,500. His profit after
deducting the $1000 cost of the premium will be $500, less the combined brokerage
fees for buying the option and selling the contract. A put option simply works in
reverse order. See Stipulation of All Relevant Facts in Lieu of Trial on Preliminary
and Permanent Injunction, SEC v. Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., Civ. A. No. 73-472
(C.D, Cal. Oct. II, 1973).
74. S. KROLL &: I. Sa1SK0, supra note 70, at 260,
75, See generally Long, supra note 70: Bus, WEEK, March 10, 1973, at 43; FonnEs,
Aug, 15, 1973, at 66; Wall St. J., June 28, 1973, at 38, col, 1 (eastern ed.).
76. Long, supra note 70, at 220.
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for abuse is correspondingly high.77 Moreover, naive investors are
attracted to this area by its "get-rich-quick" potential.78
The first comprehensive legislation regarding options was the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, which banned option trading
in all domestic commodities regulated by the Act.79 Trading in options on commodities not regulated by the Act80-mostly nonagricultural international commodities-was not affected.81 Pressure to
77. See, e.g., id. at 212-30; BARRON'S, Jan. 8, 1973, at 5, col. 2; DuN's, March 1973,
at 69-72, 119-20; FORBES, Aug. 15, 1973, at 66.
Options were identified in the late nineteenth century as one of the most easily
abused aspects of futures trading; they were intermittently allowed and prohibited
on exchanges for many years prior to 1936. As early as 1892 the Chicago Board of
Trade attempted to improve its reputation as a legitimate commercial institution
by prohibiting options. However, the directors did not vigorously attempt to discourage their members from trading in options, and when some continued to do so,
others followed. Hearings on Futures Trading Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 945, 949 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 Hearings]. Many exchange
officials became convinced that the economic benefits of options were outweighed
by the danger of their possible use to dominate futures markets. See, e.g., Hearings
on H.R. 6772 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 220 (1936) (letter from Board of Directors of the Chicago Board of Trade to
J.P. Griffin, President, Chicago Board of Trade, April 12, 1921) [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 6772]. Since buying options may sometimes be less expensive than buying
the underlying futures contract, a speculator in options can dominate a market with
less of an investment. This potential for abuse was deemed dangerous enough to
outlaw options as early as 1921. See id. at 220-24. In addition, some felt that options
trading was a prime cause of excessive price movements, See id. at 224. By the time
of the adoption of the federal ban in 1936, trading in options was already prohibited by the rules of many major futures exchanges. See id. at 225.
78. There is an alarming number of cases of fraud based on naked option schemes.
E.g., ln re Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 'if 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Commn.,
Feb. 23, 1973); Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Corp., 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP, 'if 71,058 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore Co., Feb, 27, 1973). See also N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 1974, at 61, col. 1 (late city ed.). Such cases caused many states to stiffen
their commodity option regulations. See, e.g., California Assembly Bill No. 799
(Sept. 25, 1973).
79. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1970). Several attempts to prohibit commodity options were
made before 1936, but they were confined to one exchange or to a single state. E.g.,
Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 2915.20 (Page 1953). See also 1921 Hearings, supra note 77,
at 945, 949.
80. These included silver, silver coins, platinum, cocoa, copper, coffee, and world
sugar.
81. Some options were written by domestic firms, but many of those trading in
options chose to buy through the London commodity market.
There are tW'O major recognized types of options: Mocatta options and London
options. The members of exchanges handling Mocatta options are dealers in the cash
or physical commodities themselves. Their options are covered by inventories of the
physical commodity as well as by futures contracts for such commodities. Such options
derive their name from the extensive dealings in them by the Mocatta Metals Corporation. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 827.
London options are so called because they are traded in London and often guaranteed by the International Commodities Clearing House Ltd. in London, a part
of the United Dominions Trust Group. The Clearing House handles both futures
contracts and options for futures contracts. In order to exercise an option, it is
necessary to make a request to the Clearing House that such an option be declared.
The Clearing House then substitutes an appropriate futures contract for the option
and sends a registration statement to both parties. The premium paid is turned over
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outlaw fraudulent dealings in commodity options continued, however, and was a major factor leading to the 1974 Act.82 In response
to the criticisms of option dealing, all of the comprehensive bills
introduced in the Ninety-third Congress contained a flat prohibition
on commodity options.83 Congress continued the existing ban on
options in regulated commodities in the Act as passed. However,
under strong pressure from those currently engaged in trading
unregulated options,84 Congress delegated to the Commission the
question of banning options in newly regulated commodities.
The Commission must fully consider the pros and cons of option
trading before making its decision. It would be a mistake to interpret Congress' decision to delegate the issue to it as an indication
of an intent to allow option trading in previously unregulated commodities. Neither the House nor the Senate Committee Report
gives any clear guidance to the Commission in making this decision.
In the absence of current legislative guidance, the Commission
should give attention to the arguments that Congress considered
persuasive in enacting the 1936 ban on options. In addition, recent
experience and research raises questions about the arguments presently made by the options advocates.
The fact that the 1936 ban on options in regulated commodities
has not made domestic futures markets less effective places a heavy
burden of justification on those advocating continuation of previously unregulated option trading. Proponents of option trading
have attempted to demonstrate that the situation in international
futures markets is distinguishable from that in the domestic market,
and that options would serve a valuable function in the former,
even though the judgment had been made to ban options in the
latter.85 Thus, the international commodity exchanges in New York
to the Clearing House and released only upon execution or abandonment of the
option. Options currently are guaranteed in sugar, coffee, cocoa, wooltops, soybean
oil, sunflower-seed oil, coconut oil, and cotton. See INTERNATIONAL COMIIIODITI.ES CLEAR•
ING HOUSE LTD., LONDON CoMMODITY OPTIONS (1974) [hereinafter LONDON COMMODITY
OPTIONS]; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra, at 827; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 21, 1974, at 145.
82. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 11; H.R. REP. No. 93--975,
supra note 56, at 37-39.
83. H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973 (addition of § 201 without altering 7
U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1970)); S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 308(b)(2) (1973): S. 2485, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6c(B) (1973); S. 2578, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) (addition of § 7
without altering 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1970)).
84. The hearings include several detailed statements on the benefits of option
trading. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 37, 132, 176, 190, 276; 1974
Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 463, 502, 539, 730, 795, 809. Cf. 1921 House Hearings, supra note 77, at 945, 949; Hearings on H.R. 6772, supra note 77, at 220-24,
85. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 246, 276. Options proponents
have noted that the London options market is backed up by a clearing house, and
they have pointed to the utility of domestic metals options. See id. at 176, 190. However, they have neglected to add that only some of the London options are covered
by the clearing house. Furthermore, this clearing house is a private, profit-making
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have asserted that option trading adds a measure of liquidity to their
markets that is not needed in domestic markets.86 This argument is
weakened by the fact that the exchanges have thus far managed to
conduct adequate markets in regulated commodities without options.
Their need for additional liquidity :i;ests on the assertion that the
new regulation of their markets authorized by the 1974 Act will
drive much of their business abroad,87 an assertion that Congress
rejected in deciding to regulate them.88
Thus, there is little merit fu the attempt to separate options in
domestic agricultural commodities from international commodity
options. Moreover, all of the other arguments made in favor of
option trading have drawbacks that are overlooked by their proponents. First, the options advocates frequently point to the economic justifications for option trading. They argue that by investing
in options, a company can hedge its inventory without tying up
all of the capital necessary to make the margin payments on a futures
contract,89 and note that an option purchaser can limit the maximum extent of his loss, thus facilitating planning.00 In fact, there is
often little difference benveen the costs of options and futur~s contracts. Although options do allow investors to limit potential loss,
the premium and commission charges on options usually approximate the margin requirements of futures contracts.91 In order to
make a profit, an investor must make more than the brokerage fee. 92
By trading in options the speculator thus sacrifices the opportunity
to clear a profit on a relatively small market rise; his investment is
usually of an "all or nothing" character.
A second justification for option trading is that options may be
used to finance speculative transactions with small amounts of
institution, subject to little regulation. See LONDON COMMODITY OPTIONS, supra note
81; INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES CLEAllING HOUSE LTD,, A BACKGROUND NOTE (1973);
1974 House Hearings, supra, at 176.
86. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 120-21; 1974 House Hearings, supra
note 44, at 267.
87. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 120-21,
88. It was also argued that Congress could reasonably choose not to reexamine
the existing prohibition on options without having to extend that prohibition to
options in the newly regulated commodities. "[T]he principal thrust of today's
efforts," it was contended, was to increase regulatory safeguards, rather than to alter
drastically an entire area of ongoing economic activity. 1974 House Hearings, supra
note 44, at 193. However, the 1974 Act itself recognizes that in order to increase
regulation, coverage must often be extended.
89. See text at notes 263-64 infra.
90. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 190-92, 267-68.
91. See note 71 supra.
92. As a result, speculators or hedgers in options usually either lose their entire
investment or at least double it. Interview with Houston A. Cox, Jr., Vice-President,
Reynolds Securities, Inc., New York City, Oct. 10, 1973 (memorandum of interview
on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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capital.93 Options advocates suggest that this results in savings to
producers, processors, and manufacturers and in lower consumer
prices for finished goods. In fact, however, the size of the premium
and commission charges04 paid on option contracts makes the savings
less significant, and any advantage gained from such savings must be
weighed against the danger that financially insecure traders or
fraudulent promoters will be attracted.
Supporters of option trading assert that the increased trading
facilitated by options increases the stability of futures markets. They
cite studies of speculation on futures markets suggesting that speculation reduces price fluctuations. 95 Supposedly, speculatprs sell
when prices are high, increasing supply and lowering prices, and
buy when prices are low, increasing demand and raising prices.Do A
1934 study did find that a stabilizing influence results from option
trading,97 but that study proceeded solely on the theory that speculators in options tend to trade against price movements. In a
pioneering article in 1937, H. S. Invin suggested that in fact much
trading on exchanges is movement trading,98 in which investors buy
when prices are advancing and sell short when prices are declining.
Movement trading is still a factor on today's markets.DD Such behavior tends to exaggerate fluctuations, and options make movement
trading even more attractive, because they limit the loss from guessing wrong. Thus option trading may increase market volatility, as
has long been suspected.10 0
It is also argued that if American brokerage houses and international firms are barred from trading in options, they will be at a
competitive disadvantage with foreign firms that can so trade. 101
Brokerage houses fear that this will cause business to shift abroad.
International commodity options, however, are used only by a small
number of sophisticated dealers. 102 Since it is questionable whether
93. P. MEHL, TRADING IN PRIVILEGES ON THE CmCAGO BOARD OF TRADE 78 (Dept.
of Agriculture Bull. No. 323, 1934).
94. See notes 71, 72 supra.
95. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 200.
96, ld,
97. Id. at 192.
98. lnvin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on Organized Exchanges, 27 AM. ECON, REv. 267 (1937).
99. Working, Tests of a Theory Concerning Floor Trading on Commodity Exchanges, in 7 STANFORD FOOD REsEARCH INSTlTlJTE STUDIES 24-28 (Supp. 1967).
100. See, e.g., P. MEHL, supra note 93, at 76-78; Hearings on H.R, 6772, supra
note 77, at 224.
101. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 190, 246.
102, It has been estimated that London options constitute something less than
five per cent of the transactions handled by the International Commodities Clearing
House Ltd., in London. Id. at 176. Because of the relatively high premium charged,
few small investors are attracted. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 827-28,
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options cost less than futures contracts, an options prohibition may
simply cause some clients to conclude that they can hedge just as
effectively without options.
The proponents of option trading further argue that regulation
can control abuses in option markets, thus restoring public confidence and making a complete prohibition unnecessary.103 For example, they assert that anyone familiar with option trading will be
able easily to identify financially irresponsible schemes by observing
the low premiums charged.104 But adequate regulation may not be
so simple. The limited capital requirements for entering into option
trading allow firms to begin operation and prey on unsophisticated
investors before regulation can be effective. A half-century of prob~
lems suggests that effective regulation of options is difficult, if not
impossible.
Finally, the proponents of option trading point to the London
option market as evidence that a reliable and economically useful
option market is possible. However, in that market actual holders
of futures contracts write single options on each contract.105 Many
American option undenvriters work on the different premise that
option payments can be secured by holding futures contracts for a
fixed percentage of the options issued.106 There are real questions
as to what percentage reserve is necessary, and whether such a system
can be safe at any percentage.107
It may be that the Commission will need to undertake new
studies of the economic benefits of international commodity options
and their effect on market stability before reaching a decision to
prohibit or to allow option trading in heretofore unregulated commodities. Any decision must balance the long record of concern over
market volatility and customer fraud against the benefits cited by
option trading proponents. It is submitted that without new and
convincing evidence, the marginal economic benefit. of option trading does not outweigh the proved potential for harm.

Time-Stamping and Identification of Traders in
Daily Reports
Of immediate concern to the Commission is the kind of information needed to supervise the commodity markets adequately. The
B.

103. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 267-68.
104. See id. at 194.
105. LONDON COMMODITY OPTIONS, supra note 81.
106. See Long, supra note 70, at 220-21.
107. In addition, an option dealer in America could not use the futures market
simultaneously to underwrite the purchase and sale of an option. If a dealer underwrites a purchase and a sale on the same futures contract, he cannot both buy and
sell a futures contract on an exchange, because his transactions would nullify each other.
One solution may be to require option writers to specialize in one type of future
or one iype of option, but this may be economically impractical for dealers.
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old Commodity Exchange Authority was criticized for making insufficient use of the information available to it.108 The new Commission, therefore, should establish clear requirements with respect
to the daily trading information it will use and use that information
fully.109
One heated controversy concerns the need for recording the
names of all traders in the clearing house records. The exchanges
have argued forcefully that requiring this information would be
a violation of confidentiality, that the information could not readily
be obtained,11° and that sufficient information for regulation is
already recorded. Nevertheless, there are persuasive reasons why this
information is both essential to effective regulation and feasible to
acquire.
In most exchanges, observers are stationed in raised pulpits at
each pit. These observers record the prevailing prices and times at
which trades are made and feed this information into a communications system. The prices are then sent out over the wire services.
Each participant in a trade notes on a card the price, quantity,
delivery month, and other participant for each transaction. This is the
second record of the trade, which is submitted to the clearing house
for reconciliation with the record of the other participant at the end
of the day. The clearing house will keep this record if it is accurate,m
but it will know only the identity of the customer's floor representative for the trade and not the identity of the customer himself.112
To determine the identity of the actual trader, the exchange member who conducted the trade must be consulted.113 The exchanges
have argued that, since the identity of traders is ultimately available,
it is not necessary to require traders to identify themselves to the
clearing houses.114 However, the current, indirect method of investigating possible abuses is cumbersome and time-consuming, especially
108. See, e.g., THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON THE NEED To STRENGTHEN REGULATORY PRACTICES AND STUDY CERTAIN TRADING
Acnvnms RELATING TO COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS 8-14 (1965) [hereinafter 1965
REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER]; OFFICE OF THE !NSPECfOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT, OF
AGRICULTURE, AUDIT R.El'oRT OF THE COMMODITY ExCHANGE AUTHORITY 8, 23-26 (1971)
[hereinafter OIG REPORT].
109. The drafters of one proposed bill explicitly set forth the information exchanges
should be asked to supply to federal authorities. Johnson Interview, supra note 12,
This provision was adopted by the Senate, S• .REP. No. 93-1131, supra note 62, at 9, 44,
but was modified in conference, so that the decision as to what information should be
required was left to the Commission. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 415, 88 Stat. 1415,
110. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 309, 342-43, 403, 534-36,
111. For more detail, see T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 30-32, 40-44,
112. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 204.
113. See CoMMODlTY EXCHANGE AUTHORITY, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT USDA-INDUSTRY STUDY TEAM ON FUTURES TRADING DATA SYsr.EMS
14-15 (1974) (hereinafter FUTURES DATA REPORT].
114. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 534-36.
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when a large number of transactions is being investigated. Information on the activities of a single trader or group of traders is not
readily available. Moreover, Commodity Exchange Authority investigations, or trade-practice investigations,115 have generally involved detailed examinations of all trades of futures contracts in a
particular commodity on a particular exchange during a specified
time period.116 These investigations have been inhibited by the
need to consult several sources to obtain necessary information.117
A related and important issue is whether to require exchange
clearing houses to include the time of each trade in daily trading
reports to the Commission. Only two small exchanges presently
require brokers to time-stamp trades as they are made.118 On the
larger exchanges, a trade is time-stamped when the order is received
by the broker on the exchange floor and again when he returns it
from the floor to the clearing member's representative.119 Much
time may elapse between these events, and when trading is active it
may become impossible to determine when a trade was made.
Both the Comptroller General and the Administrator of the
Commodity Exchange Authority have concluded that certain abusive
practices are virtually impossible to detect without more accurate
time-stamping.120 The final report of the Joint USDA-Industry Study
Team on Futures Trading Data Systems concluded: "Lack of precise information on the time of execution has handicapped regulation. The ability to reconstruct the exact sequence of trades has
proven to be particularly valuable in investigating alleged trade
practice violations. Such investigations have been thwarted on occasions by the inability to reconstruct trading. The timing of trades
is also important for certain types of manipulation investigations."121
115. "According to the CEA, trade-pra~ce investigations represent the best means
by which it can obtain information concerning the general trading practices on a
futures market and detect violations in trading practices." 1965 REPORT OF THE
COMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 9. A fundamental purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act, unchanged by the 1974 Act, is to guard against speculation, manipulation
and control, and sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in prices that are detrimental
to producers, handlers, and consumers. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
116. For more detail, see 1965 REPORT OF THE CoMPTRoLLER, supra note 108, at 8-9.
The CEA has been criticized for conducting too few investigations, and for failing
to follow up those that have been conducted. See materials cited note 108 supra.
For a discussion of past studies of CEA trades-practice investigations and their shortcomings, see FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 1-3.
117. See OIG REPORT, supra note 108, at 6.
118. These are the Minneapolis Grain Exchange and the New York Mercantile
Exchange. 120 CONG. REc. SlS,867 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974): FUTURES DATA REPoRT,
supra note 113, at 41.
119. FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 40.
120. 120 CONG. REc. SlS,868 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (Letter from the Comptroller
General to Senator Clark, Sept. 16, 1974 [hereinafter Letter of Comptroller General];
Letter from Alex Caldwell, Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority, to Senator
Talmadge, Sept. 11, 1974 [hereinafter Caldwell Letter]).
121. FUTURES DATA REPoRT, supra note lllt, at 5.
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Futures exchanges frequently experience rapid price movements.
A dlfference of seconds in the execution of a contract can result in a
substantial price difference.122 Detection of abusive practices will be
greatly aided if federal regulators can obtain data about the order
of trades and the identity of traders from a single source. 123 Thus,
accurate time-stamping would aid detection of floor brokers and
futures commission merchants who trade for themselves before they
fill customers' orders,124 or who favor certain customers over
others.125 Such information also would help determine whether
traders were improperly manipulating the closing price for a particular contract on a given day. 126 The need for adequate information is highlighted by recent official reports finding substantial evidence of previously undetected violations of trading rules.127
· Some exchanges have contended that time-stamping is impractical and would disrupt futures markets,128 but there are strong indications to the contrary. Time-stamping is already required on two
exchanges,129 and the Administrator of the Commodity Exchange
Authority has stated that its extension to all exchanges is feasible. 180
He admitted that time-stamping might delay execution or reporting
of trades, but concluded that the problems would not be significant.
The final report of the recent Joint USDA-Industry Study Team
on Futures Trading Data Systems suggested several alternative pro122. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 58-59.
123. As the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Richard L. Feltner, explained to
the Senate Agriculture Committee: "The major purpose of this legislation, of course,
is to increase the ability to regulate • • • • The more information you have about
the people who are trading, about the timing of trades, and exactly what took place,
the more effective job you are going to be able to do of regulating this market,"
1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 243.
124. See text at notes 140-200 infra. Time-stamping also would help to determine
the extent of market participation by floor traders, and the influence of such par•
ticipation on futures prices. See FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 40.
125. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 38-40.
126. In its report on the Russian grain transaction, the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations stated that the
failure to record the times of trades made it impossible to determine whether orders
to buy and sell on the Kansas City Board of Trade had affected closing prices. Such
information was needed to determine whether large grain e..'<porters were attempting
to push up closing prices in order to increase the export subsidies paid to them by the
United States government on their sales of grain to Russia. Letter of Comptroller General, supra note 120,
127. See, e.g., OIG REPORT, supra note 108, at 7. These findings, combined with
numerous allegations in the press, compelled the Congress to require closer surveil•
lance of the markets. See, e.g., 119 CONG, REc. S23,502-20 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973);
119 CoNG, REc. Sl7,732-34 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington Star-News,
Sept. 25, 1973; Mollenhof, Risser & Anthan, supra note 41, at 813,
.128. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. Sl8,867 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974); 120 CoNG, REc.
S18,872 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (Letter from John Rainbolt, Associate Counsel, House
Agriculture Comm,, to the Editor, Washington Star-News, Oct. 8, 1974).
129. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
130. Caldwell Letter, supra note 120.
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cedures by which information on execution times could be conveniently reported.131
The exchanges have made the additional argument that preserving the confidentiality of traders' identities and times of trades
outweighs the benefits of having this information collected.182 They
claim that traders may be disadvantaged if it becomes known that
they are long or short in particular contracts.133 But information on
traders' positions is often available even on current markets, and
has not seriously hampered traders' operations. Moreover, information collection systems can be designed to protect confidentiality.
For instance, the Joint USDA-Industry Study Team on Futures
Trading Data Systems has suggested a data system designed to allow
the federal authorities to match each trade and each trader on the
basis of the filings of traders and clearing members on each trade.134
The trade information would not be matched with the identity of
the traders before reaching the federal regulators.186
The inclusion of the time of the trade and the identity of the
trader in the information supplied to the clearing houses would be
only a small addition to the data already supplied. Yet, one legislator has callecJ. the provision allowing the Commission to require
such information186 "potentially of more importance to the enforcement of this act than any other provision therein." 137 The present
Commodity Exchange Authority Administrator has indicated that a
change in information requirements will not be difficult to institute.138 The legislative history of the 1974 Act strongly suggests the
intent of the Congress to include time and identity information
131. See FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, pt. 4.
132. See id. at xviii.
133. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 342-43.
134. See generally FUTURES DATA R.EPoin-, supra note 113.
135. There is a strong argument that it would be more efficient to compile this
information at the clearing-house level. Since clearing houses receive all available
information except the identity of the trader and the time of the trade, it would
be more economical to add that data to their records than to burden the federal
authorities with matching two data pools. One exchange has claimed that requiring
this information to be included in its records might jeopardize its ability to dear
each day's transactions overnight, 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 536, but
this argument is not persuasive. As Senator Clark commented, "[y]ou [the exchange]
keep hundreds of bits of information. It doesn't seem to me that [keeping traders'
identities and time records] would add any great additional burden, if it were
deenal important." Id.
136. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 415, 88 Stat. 1415, amending Commodity Exchange Act
§ 4g(2), 7 u.s.c. § 6g(2) (1970).
137. 120 CoNG, REc. HI0,262 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974) (remarks of Representative
Wampler).
138. As the Administrator pointed out, the information will come from the
clearing members and not from individual traders. Clearing members already report
all information except the time of the trade and the name of the trader . to the
clearing house and in some cases even the name of the customer is included. 1974
Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 244; Caldwell Letter, supra note 120.
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in trading reports as soon as practically possible.139 With this
background, the Commission should find the case for requiring new
information compelling.
C. Elimination of Conflicts of Interest
Few issues in the recent debate on futures trading reform have
provoked as much disagreement as the question whether floor
brokers and futures commission merchants should be permitted to
engage in dual trading, that is, trading for their own accounts as
well as for the accounts of their customers. The Congress delegated
this issue to the new Commission, but required that it be resolved
within six months.140 The Commission may continue to hold hearings after its initial decision, and it may adjust its rules to meet the
needs of changing conditions. However, as Senator Clark has pointed
out, "[i]t is likely that the chief witnesses-and perhaps the only
ones-before a Commission hearing on the subject would be the
exchanges. Since the exchanges are made up of floor brokers, there is
no doubt that the exchanges will argue that dual trading is essential • • • ."141 Yet, there is considerable evidence that the present
practice of allowing dual trading is detrimental to the interests of
producers, handlers, and consumers-the parties that federal futures
regulation should protect.142
In the quickly moving futures markets, the speed with which
customer orders are filled can make an enormous difference in contract price. Currently, a customer's order to buy or sell a futures
contract is transmitted to a futures commission merchant143 (FCM)
or to a floor broker,144 who fills the order. Under the old Commodity
Exchange Act, the order must be filled on the floor of the exchange
by "public outcry"; the FCM or floor broker cannot himself assume
the other side of the contract.145 However, the floor broker may
trade for himself or for the FCM for whom he works at the same
time he fills customer orders.146 Thus, a floor broker may trade for
himself one moment and trade to fill a customer's order the next.
Also, because most FCM's employ several floor brokers, one broker
may fill a customer order by trading with another broker who works
139. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. S18,866-72 (daily ed. Oct. IO, 1974); 120 CONG, R.Ec.
HI0,262-63 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974).
140. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 203, 88 Stat. 1396.
141. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 204,
142. See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1970). Several government reports and a House Committee
Report have recommended that dual trading by brokers be forbidden. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 93-963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 52-54 (1974); OIG REPORT, supra note 108.
143. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
144. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
145. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970).
146. See generally H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 52-54.
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for the same FCM, and who is trading for his own account or for
the house account of the FCM.
Critics argue that this system is ripe for abuse because FCM's
and brokers are given incentive to realize on favorable trading
opportunities for their own accounts, rather than for the accounts
of their customers.147 Furthermore, public confidence in the futures
markets is eroded because a customer who makes a bad trade has
good reasons to suspect his FCM or floor broker of a breach of duty.
The exchanges respond, first, that there is no problem; second, that
to the extent that there is a problem, it can be adequately handled
by regulation; and, finally, that the elimination of such problems
as do exist would create more harm than benefit.
Although the exchanges have recognized the potential for abuse
arising from dual trading by floor brokers, in particular, they have
asserted that actual violations have been few. 148 Frederick Uhlmann,
Board Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade, told the House
Agriculture Committee that he could "state categorically that . • •
there have been very, very few documented cases of such abuses."149
Several recent studies directly contradict such claims. In a 1965
report, the Comptroller General reviewed selected futures transactions on one exchange and found forty-seven instances of questionable trading practices during a three-month period.160 In nineteen
of these cases, the records indicated that floor brokers had filled
customers' orders noncompetitively by taking the opposite side of
the transaction either for their o,vn account or for the account of
their FCM.151 An audit report of the Commodity Exchange Authority in 1971 also found evidence of widespread abusive trading
practices.162
The exchanges argue that the problem must be minor because
it is difficult and unprofitable for floor brokers to engage in abusive
147. See notes 152, 160-62 infra and accompanying text. William Phelan, Director
of the Investigations Office, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, has acknowledged that
"[t]here's an unbelievable temptation, if the trader sees that his own account shows
a loss and the customer's account shows a profit, to substitute the trades." 119 CONG.
REc. 523,504: (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973).
148. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 128-29; House Small Business
Hearings, supra note 38, at 163, 192, 259; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 521.
149. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44:~ at 163.
150. 1965 REPORT OF THE CoMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 11.
151. Id.
152. These included an excessive number of trades between brokers executing
customer and house-account orders for the same firm, numerous trades between part•
ners or members of the same firm, and trades in which the same broker represented
both parties. Id. at 6-7, 59-67. During the period of dramatic rises in futures prices
in 1973, several articles critical of futures trading regulation drew attention to allegations of unethical practices. See, e.g., 119 CoNG. R.Ec. S23,502·20 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1973); 119 CONG, R.Ec. Sll,732-34: (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington Star•
News, Sept. 25, 1973.
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practices.153 An official of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange explained that a broker is legally responsible for executing all of his
customers' orders pertaining to given futures contracts. Orders
must be time-stamped when they come to the broker and again
when they are retumed.1u 4 Times can thus be checked against the
exchange's record of market prices at different times.11:m If the broker
fails to execute an order, or if he was negligent on the basis of what
the exchange indicates the price of execution should have been, he
can be held personally responsible for the customer's loss.1uo Such
liability can be extensive. In addition, exchange officials assert that
the severity and strict enforcement of rules prohibiting such conduct
make it unlikely that floor brokers will breach their duties.1 1i 7
Nevertheless, witnesses who have traded on futures markets have
stated that abusive practices are prevalent.158 First, they have pointed
out that there is considerable doubt as to how rigorously the exchanges enforce their regulations.150 Second, the pace and informality
of futures trading create numerous opportunities for abuse.100 Even
a wink of an eye or a tug at an ear can indicate to a floor trader that
he should buy from or sell to his friend, and then quickly get out
of the market.161 It may be both profitable and simple for a floor
broker to abuse his dual position by trading on his own account.
Because of the volatility of the markets, and the volume at which
153. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 129,
154. Id. at 194.
155. However, there may be a long period of time between the broker's initial
receipt of the order and his return of the executed order.
156. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 194.
157. Id. at 129 (statement of F. Uhlmann, Chairman of the Board, Chicago Board
of Trade); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 331 (statement of J. Geldermann,
Chairman of the Board, Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
158. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 52-54; House Small Busi•
ness Hearings, supra note 38, at 50, 58 (testimony of H. Fortes, former Vice Chairman,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange); id. at 258-59 (statement of Special Subcommittee
Counsel Jacob Gross).
159. An unidentified former official of the Chicago Board of Trade has been
quoted as indicating that proposals to regulate closely the operation of scalpers
have been under preparation for years. But, he asserted, "[t]hey always seem to get
shot down at the end of the runway," because the Board of Directors is dominated
by floor brokers, and a majority faction always votes the regulations down. 119 CoNC:.
R.Ec. Sll,727-30 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington Star-News, Sept. 24,
1973.
160. A House Subcommittee found the possibilities for abuse "so great as to stagger
the imagination." H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 53.
161. It is not even necessary that there be direct collusion. A knowledge of .the
habits of fellow brokers and their customers, or of their usual actions when they
have large orders to fill, can enable a broker to go in and out of the market on the
price movement created by a large order. Because futures markets arc susceptible to
sharp movements in reaction to sizeable individual orders, there is substantial temp•
tation for a trader with knowledge of such an order to "ride the wave." 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 50, at 9-10 (testimony of Representative Smith).
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floor brokers can deal, they may make tens of thousands of dollars
by engaging in dual trading.162 These potential gains make the risk
of exchange discipline less menacing.
If abuses do exist, the exchanges argue, they may be controlled
by exchange and federal rules and regulations, without abolishing
dual trading entirely.163 Exchange witnesses have argued that federal regulators already have the power to investigate floor brokers'
activities and to issue complaints when they find violations of federal rules. 164 However, in most cases it is difficult to obtain the
evidence necessary to prove a violation.165 The problem is caused in
part by the failure of some exchanges to time-stamp their orders or
to record the names of customers who place orders.166 But even if
the Commission required that this information be included in the
daily trading reports, it would remain impossible in many cases
directly to establish collusion between brokers. For example, abuse
would be particularly hard to detect in a case in which a floor broker
had several orders to fill within ten seconds during a major price
movement. Even strict regulations can provide no practical deterrent in such situations.
The exchanges make a compelling argument that dual trading
should be preserved because it is necessary to exchange liquidity,167
which they claim is essential to a successful market.168 A liquid
market has a sufficient supply of bids and offers, which facilitates
smooth price movements and swift execution of orders.169 Exchange
officials note that a floor broker must at times assume the other side
in a trade with one of his customers in order to provide the best
execution of the customer's order.17° Furthermore, they assert, the
162. See id. at IO.
163. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 331-33, 521-22.
164. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 96 (statement of H. Christopher, President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.).
165. H.R. REP. No. 93-438, supra note 62, at 53; House Small Business Hearings,
supra note 38, at 337 (testimony of A. Caldwell, Administrator, Commodity Exchange
Authority); id. at 306-07, (testimony of L. Greess, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture).
166. See text at notes 108-39 supra.
167. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 71, 96, 129, 137, 164, 194;
House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 163, 214; 1974 Senate Hearings,
supra note 37, at 313, 332, 386, 522, 672.
168. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 96.
169. See, e.g., id.; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 332, 397.
170. [F]loor brokers frequently are given a large order in a specified delivery
month: which will require several transactions to complete. As the broker exe- ·
cutes this order he may see that its size is causing the price in that delivery
month to move out of line with prices in other delivery months. In such a situation, the broker may find that he can effect the best execution for his customer
by taking the opposite side of his customer's order (with the prior consent of
the customer), while taking offsetting positions in different delivery months.
1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 117.
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market created by the trades of floor brokers allows commercial
interests to fill their hedge orders without delay. This is especially
important on the smaller markets, where commercial interests may
account for ninety per cent of all transactions.171 Even on the larger
markets, dual trading by floor brokers allegedly adds needed
:flexibility.172
The major fallacy in this liquidity argument is that floor brokers
have no obligation to trade for themselves when markets are thin.
They have no responsibility to the exchange,173 and in fact brokers
are unlikely to trade in a market that is not also attractive to nonbroker traders. Many feel that floor brokers trade for themselves
mostly in periods of substantial customer volume. 174 A second
weakness is that there is little agreement on the degree of liquidity
necessary for a smoothly functioning futures market. One exchange official defined a liquid market simply as one in which a
person coming to buy or sell can be confident of receiving a reasonable price,175 because such a market will tend not to suffer from
sudden :fluctuations in price.176 But this analysis overlooks the detrimental effect that personal trading by floor traders and brokers may
have on the market. It is generally suspected that floor brokers
trading for their own accounts concentrate more on intra-day
trading, or scalping,177 than on position trading.178 A major SEC
study of the securities markets found that "floor traders tend to have
a destabilizing influence on prices..•. [F]loor traders are generally
buyers in rising markets and sellers in declining markets .... Their
trading, as a result, is inimical to the orderly functioning of the mar•
ket, tending to accentuate rather than stabilize price movements." 170
I'll. House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 225.
172. Supposedly, when volume is heavy, floor brokers fill customer orders; when
volume declines, they tend to trade for their own accounts. 197!J House Hearings,
supra note 50, at 129.
173. The situation is different on the securities exchanges, where specialist brokers
do have such a responsibility. See note 181 infra.
1'74. See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3'7, at 203, 376.
175. Id. at 341 (statement of J. Geldcrmann, Chairman of the Board, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange).
176. For this reason, many feel that there can never be too much liquidity, See,
e.g., id. at 284 (Letter of R. Richards, Vice-President, CPC International, Inc., repre•
senting the National Grain 8: Feed Association).
177. See text following note 27 supra, A scalper "attempt[s] to make a financial
profit by entering and exiting from a market. in short periods of time after a very
small profit has been made." B. GOULD, Dow-JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO CollU.IODITIES
TRADING 351 (1973). Sec also T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 45-46.
178. Sec. e.g., 1965 R.El'oRT OF THE Col\Il'TROLLER, supra note 108, at 22. Position
traders hold long or short positions over a period of days, weeks, or months. See Il,
Gouw, supra note 177, at 350; S. KROLL 8: I. SmsKo, supra note 70, at 212.
179. Sl>ECIAL STUDY OF SEcURITIES MArumTs OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COllt•
MISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 240 (1963) [hereinafter SEC
SPECIAL STUDY].
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A similar analysis pertains to trading by floor brokers on futures markets. A floor broker has an advantage over an outsider in his ability
to move in and out of markets quickly, and to make a profit on small
price movements. If he sees a market trend, a broker is more likely
to attempt to profit from it within one day than to tie up his capital
in long-range transactions.180 Thus, the advantage of dual trading in
terms of smoothing out price movements may well be outweighed by
the tendency of dual trading to encourage artificial price levels.181
The exchanges object to the proposed prohibition of dual trading
because they fear it will precipitate an undesirable restructuring
of the markets. Brokers forced to choose between serving customers
and their mm accounts allegedly will choose the latter.182 This will
force customers to take their business to new brokers with less experience and skill. But, if in fact most skilled brokers would choose to
trade for themselves (which seems unlikely given the diverse business interests of floor brokers), the resulting shortage surely would
not be permanent. The supply of customers would attract new
brokers who would develop the requisite skills.
The exchanges claim that a prohibition on dual trading will have
the additional undesirable consequence of discouraging speculation
and will result in the domination of markets by commercial interests.183 Recent increases in trading activity, however, suggest that
180. See 1965 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 24 (CEA investigations of practices in the September 1971 rye futures market).
181. While the available evidence suggests that liquid futures markets could function adequately without dual trading, some observers have suggested that a specialist
system should be adopted by the futures markets, similar to the one that exists in the
securities exchanges. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 127 (testimony of
A. Economou, President, American Board of Trade; President, American Association
of Commodity Traders); id. at 189 (testimony of J. Bianco, Yale Legislative Services,
Yale University Law School). Such a system seems unnecessary and unsuited to fu.
tures markets. A specialist is an exchange ·member who is granted permission by the
exchange to trade in several specialty stocks. He executes certain orders for other
brokers and is responsible for making a fair and orderly market in each specialty
stock. See SEC SPECIAL SrunY, supra note 179, pt. 2, at 57-59. But securities exchanges,
unlike futures exchanges, handle trades in a large number of stocks that can be
divided easily among specialists. On a futures exchange, the volume of trading in one
contract will often be too large for any one broker to handle, while in another
contract there may not be enough activity to sustain a broker. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 342 (statement of J. Geldermann, Chairman of the Board,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange). Furthermore, a specialist on a securities exchange is
given a virtual monopoly, which can be extremely lucrative. Unless such a system is
absolutely necessary to maintain liquidity on futures exchanges, its anticompetitive
effects make its adoption undesirable. Cf. Pozen, Competition and Regulation in the
Stock Markets, 73 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1975).
182. See, e.g., 197J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 129; 1974 Senate Hearings,
supra note 37, at 275.
183. The reasons for this would be twofold. First, a forced separation of functions
would result in less total speculative activity by brokers. Second, some of those speculators whose brokers become only floor traders may not enter the market because of lack
of confidence in other brokers. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 106-07 (testi•
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substantial speculation in these markets will continue whether or
not dual trading is banned.184 As long as many commodities remain
scarce, and prices remain high, it is unlikely that speculators will
lose their interest in the futures markets. Moreover, a decrease in
speculation might not be unwelcome. Although some speculation
is necessary to maintain liquidity, many analysts feel that excessive
speculation may add to artificial price levels and thus distort the
markets. 185 Moreover, the markets are useful primarily because they
serve commercial interests, and a more dominant position for these
interests might be a beneficial side effect of prohibiting dual
trading.186
A more troubling objection is that a ban on dual trading might
substantially weaken the smaller exchanges and deter the formation
of new exchanges.187 While the dangers of dual trading on the large
exchanges seem to outweigh the benefits, the equation may change
if a ban would jeopardize the existence of smaller exchanges. One
might answer that exchanges that cannot survive under a ban on
dual trading are not economically viable, and should be allowed to
collapse.188 However, the flexibility and competitive pressure brought
about when larger numbers of markets trade in the same contracts
are advantages that should not be dismissed lightly. Furthermore,
on small markets it is easier to monitor broker practices for possible
abuses. The Commission thus might make an exception for exchanges with a trade volume below a certain level. It could determine at what volume there is sufficient liquidity to absorb a ban on
trades for brokers' o,;vn accounts without creating severe instability.
This solution was proposed in Congress,189 and the emphasis in the
1974 Act on maintaining liquidity seems to justify its adoption by
the Commission.
Finally, it could be argued that an absolute prohibition on dual
mony of L. Melamed, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange); id. at 165 (testimony
of F. Uhlmann, Chairman, Chicago Board of Trade).
184. For statistics on the recent growth in futures trading, see 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 543-47 (attachments to statement of J. Clagett, President,
Association of Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc., New York, N.Y.).
185. See text accompanying notes 178-81 supra.
186. Futures markets have developed into a means of providing commercial interests with a way to transfer risk to those willing to assume it. Therefore, while
speculators are needed, so long as there are sufficient numbers of them to facilitate
hedging, domination of the market by commercial interests is not objectionable.
187. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 17 (statement of Dr. C. Yeutter, Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Consumer Services, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 386-87 (testimony of A. Donahoo,
Executive Vice-President, Minneapolis Grain Exchange); id, at 738 (testimony of R.
Schotland, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
188. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 686 (testimony of G. Clark,
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School).
189. See S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 308 (1973).
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trading by floor brokers might prevent them from correcting orders
that either were not executed or were inaccurately executed.190 A
floor broker must assume the risk of error in filling his customer's
order;191 he must make the customer's order good, either by paying
the difference bet\veen what the customer earned from the erroneous transaction and what the customer would have earned had
his order been executed correctly, or by carrying out a proper
reexecution. Even if brokers would continue to bear the financial
burden of incorrect execution under a ban on dual trading, the ban
would make it more difficult' for a customer to obtain his desired
contract because the broker could not rectify the mistake· by trading
for his own account with the customer, as is done under the current
system. Moreover, the broker would bear a greater potential risk
because he would be dependent on others to execute the correcting
order, which will determine the extent of his liability for the original mistake. If, on the other hand, the ban precipitates a shift in
liability for the error to the clearing firm or the customer, the result
could be less attention to the execution of orders and higher costs
to the customer.192 Therefore, an exception probably should be
made in a Commission ban on dual trading to allow brokers to enter
the market under carefully circumscribed conditions to rectify their
errors in executing customer orders.
Although there are many differences bet\\Teen futures markets
and securities markets, it is useful to note that the Securities and
Exchange Commission has long been concerned with the abuses
fostered by dual trading.193 A 1963 SEC study of the securities
markets found that regulation of dual trading at that time was inadequate.194 The study contended that the privilege of access to the
trading floor was a substantial advantage; the trader was able to
observe trading activity at close range, thus developing a "feel" for
the market, and could enter and exit in a matter of seconds. Similar
advantages accrue to floor brokers on futures exchanges. Furthermore, securities futures brokers trading for their own accounts may
avoid the standard commission costs, by executing either for themselves or through other floor brokers.195 These advantages of access
to the trading floor place the retail customer at a competitive dis190. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 67 (letter from F. Corrigan,
Peavey Co., Minneapolis, Minn., to W.R. Poage, Chairman, House Comm. on Agriculture); id. at 195 (statement of L. Melamed, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
191. See text at note 156 supra.
192. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 195 (statement of L. Melamed, Secretary, Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
193. See SEC SPECIAL SnmY, supra note 179, pt. 2, at 238-42.
194. Id.
195. See 1965 REroRT OF THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 23.
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advantage, and can be eliminated only by prohibiting dual trading,
as the securities study strongly recommended.196
The objections to dual trading by floor brokers discussed above
apply similarly to dual trading by futures commission merchants.
An FCM may maintain a house account, and may trade for itself
at the same time that it advises customers and solicits or fills cus•
tomer orders. Many FCM's allow their account executives197 to
maintain personal trading accounts, which the executives manage in
addition to clients' accounts. Because a large order can have a significant impact on trading in a particular futures contract, a poten•
tial conflict of interest arises whenever an FCM holds a position
in the same commodity. Furthermore, in periods of heavy trading
a floor trader may be tempted to neglect his client's position in favor
of trading for himself. A ban on FCM trading for personal accounts
would prevent both these conflicts from arising.198
Prohibiting dual trading would also prevent FCM's from making
unfair use of inside information. Although exchange officials contend that inside information is not a major problem on the futures
markets,199 the ready access of FCM's to market information gives
them a competitive edge over retail customers. Although FCM's have
no better access to highly confidential information, such as govern•
ment commodity reports, they do receive much useful information
through informal interchanges on and near the exchange floors.
Some observers argue that customers prefer to deal with an FCM
who is a market trader. Personal trading supposedly gives the FCM
a better feel for the market; if an FCM risks his (or its) own money,
his recommendations will carry more weight.200 However, respon•
sible FCM's should stay closely attuned to the markets whether or
not they are personally involved in trading. Furthermore, FCM's
who trade for their own accounts need not communicate their best
strategies to their customers.
If the weight of the arguments on this issue had been clear,
Congress probably would not have delegated the decision to the
196, SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 179, pt. 2, at 241-42,
197, An account executive is commonly known as a "broker,"
198, It is interesting to note that uvo of the largest commission houses arc so con-

cerned by this problem that they will not allow their salesmen or other employees to
trade on futures markets; nor will they deal with brokers who trade for their own ac,
counts as well as for their customers. Interview with Paul H. Franklin, Jr., Director
of Commodity Division, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 8: Smith, Inc., in New York,
N.Y., Aug. 10, 1973 (memorandum of interview on file with the Michigan Law Review);
Interview with Robert L. Radin, Vice-President, Paine, Webber, Jackson 8: Curtis, in
Chicago, Ill., Aug. 17, 1973 (memorandum of interview on file with the Michigan Law
Review).
199. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 313 (testimony of C. Bradley,
President, The Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.).
200. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 57 (testimony of M. Madulf, Madulf
8: Sons, Chicago, Ill.); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 713,

March 1975]

Notes

739

Commission. Uncertainty, however, should not indicate that a
compromise is the best solution. Compromise is dangerous in the
area of ethical market conduct; if futures markets are to be fair,
and if public confidence in them is to be achieved, every taint of
abusive practices must be eliminated. Dual trading should thus be
prohibited, with the exceptions discussed above.

D. Computerized Trading
During the hearings on the 1974 Act, Congress received testimony on proposals to computerize the entire futures trading system.201 Under these proposals, all buy and sell orders would be
matched electronically by an exchange computer. Although this
system could largely eliminate the problems of inadequate daily
trading information and floor trading abuses discussed above,202
Congress apparently concluded that the idea did not . currently
warrant legislative action. However, the new Act does require that
the Commission conduct ongoing research into computerized
trading. 203 No time limit is set on this study, nor is there a provision
for later reports to congressional committees. Unless the newly
appointed Commissioners give priority to this issue, therefore, a
decision on whether to encourage computerization could be postponed indefinitely. The discussion below will center upon the
potential advantages of computerized trading, and indicate why
objections to it are unpersuasive.
Under the current system,204 the chaos of the marketplace sometimes prevents orders from being filled in the sequence in which
they are received.205 Moreover, at a given moment prices may
vary within a pit for the same contract on the same commodity,206
because brokers in the pit sometimes cannot hear each other's bids
above the din of the trading floor. An electronic system would
alleviate these problems because it would permit trading in an
orderly manner. Such a system would replace floor trading. Buy and
sell orders would be fed into a computer, which would match the
orders automatically.207 An accurate record of daily trading, includ201. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 244-47, 253-54.
202. See text at notes 108-200 supra.
203. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 416, 88 Stat. 1415 (1974).
204. The essentials of the present trading system developed during the middle of
the nineteenth century. See generally CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING
MANUAL 1-12 (1973); T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 69-91; H. IRWIN, EVOLUTION
OF FUTURES TRADING (1st ed. 1954). Today the exchanges have a far larger volume
and different trading problems, but their trading system has not changed substantially.
See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 352.
205. See id. at 253.
206. Id.
207. House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 340; Johnson Interview,
supra note 12.
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ing the names of actual traders, could easily be provided to federal
regulators.208 If market manipulation were suspected, the pattern of
trading could be quickly and accurately reconstructed.
Computerization would end the potential abuses of dual trading.209 Collusion and careful mutual timing of trades would be more
difficult in a computerized system. Moreover, such a system would
protect customers from the inequities that would remain possible
even if the Commission were to prohibit dual trading. Even under
a ban, floor traders might enter into advantageous schemes with
brokers.21° For example, a broker on the exchange floor might signal
a floor trader of his intention to place a large order, in return for a
percentage of the floor trader's profits attributable to the tip. On an
electronic market, such schemes would be more difficult to execute,
because of uncertainties in timing.
Finally, a computerized system would lessen the influence of
rumors on the futures markets.211 Rumors circulating on the exchange floor presently can have a decided effect on trading. If floor
traders, on the basis of their "feel" for the market, believe that
trading is moving in a certain direction, they ·will quickly buy in and
out, thereby accentuating the trend.212 A computerized market
could not accommodate trades at a frantic pace because of technological limits, and would thus force traders to wait a few moments
between trades. This waiting period would make wild price movements less likely.213
The idea of a computerized market has met strong opposition
from established traders and institutions.214 A common objection is
that computerized trading is not technologically feasible. Even the
exchanges are divided on this argument,216 however, and insufficient
data are available to resolve the issue conclusively. Officials of the
Chicago Board of Trade have cited a study of computerized trading
made for the new Pacific Commodities Exchange that showed that
it would be technologically feasible, but economically impractical,
to develop such a system.216 Federal regulatory authorities also
208. See FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 86.
209. See text at notes 140-200 supra.
210. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 204 (statement of Senator
Clark).
211. Id.
212. See text at notes 178-80 supra.
213. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 59-60.
214. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70, 95, 116, 190; House Small
Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 162; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310,
351-52.
215. Compare 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310, 351, with 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 50, at 127.
216. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 127 (testimony of F. Uhlmann, Chair•
man of the Board, Chicago Board of Trade).
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believe that a computerized system is possible,217 but they cannot
predict t4e cost of a system without further studies.218 Complicating
the lack of data is the forecast that the burden of adopting a computerized system would be heaviest on the less affluent, smaller
exchanges.219
Some exchanges suggest that no action be taken until the securities markets adopt a computerized system.220 Those markets then
will have assumed the financial burden of the technological development, and the futures exchanges would need only absorb the cost
of adapting the system to fit their own needs. But delaying the
decision in this manner has disadvantages. Futures markets differ
substantially from securities markets, and the adaptation process
might be difficult and time-consuming. Furthermore, immediate
and pressing problems pervade the futures markets,221 and delay in
solving them might in the long run be more costly than immediate
action.
There are three ways to reduce the costs to the exchanges of
developing a computerized system. First, the Commission could
encourage the exchanges to pool their resources and develop a joint
system. Second, the Commission could request federal appropriations. Given the advantages of a computerized system for effective
regulation, and the likelihood that the exchanges ·will not take the
initiative in this area, the federal government should perhaps sponsor
the necessary development. Finally, the securities and the futures
exchanges could cooperate in developing the necessary technology.
Many exchange officials are concerned that even if all of the
technological and economic obstacles could be overcome, a computer system would not ,adequately safeguard the information it
would contain.222 Much trading data is already filed with clearing
houses on the larger exchanges, however, and this system has not
caused any major problems.223 If the detailed recommendations of
217. See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 253 (testimony of A. Caldwell, Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority).
218. See the recommendations for further study in FUTURES DATA Rm>oKr, supra
note 113, at 85-86.
219. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70 (testimony of A. Donahoo,
Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Minneapolis, Minn.).
220. See, e.g., id. at 116 (testimony of R. Clark, representing the New York Coffee
&: Sugar Exchange, Inc., The Commodity Exchange, Inc., and the New York Cocoa
Exchange, Inc.).
221. See, e.g., text at notes 205-13 supra.
222. See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310 (testimony of W. Vernon,
III, Executive Vice-President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.). One exchange
official asserted that the possibilities of unauthorized access to data systems "stagger
the imagination • • • ." Id.
223. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 40-43; House Small Business Hearings,
supra note 38, at 198-202 (testimony of R. Westley, Chairman of the Board of Governors, Board of Trade Clearing Corp.).
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the Joint USDA-Industry Study Team on Futures Trading Data
Systems are adopted, the data reporting and storage arrangement
would be highly mechanized. The Study Team concluded that such
a system would adequately protect confidentiality.224
It has been argued that trading from remote computer terminals
would .make it difficult to investigate the financial status of one's
trading partners.225 But even under present trading conditions, floor
traders often do not know the identity or financial status of the other
party. Moreover, the computerized system could screen participants,
as is done now in deciding who will be allowed to trade on the
exchange floors. 226
Another criticism relates to the ability of computers to allow
for rapid correction of trading errors and withdrawal of bids and
offers.221 The necessity of placing orders through terminals limits
somewhat the ability of traders to reverse trading directions quickly.
The present federal administrator, however, has claimed that a computerized system could be made practical in this respect.228 One
possibility would be to allow orders to be withdrawn only if they
have not been immediately matched. This might decrease market
flexibility, but it would encourage traders to give closer attention to
each trade. This solution might actually have a positive effect on
market stability, by making rapid speculative trading more difficult.
A final and more basic objection to computerization stresses the
human element, which supposedly makes markets more responsive
to users.229 Brokers use intuition and judgment in bargaining for
their customers, intangibles that will be less important in an electronic marketplace. A mechanical system that matches orders without offering an opportunity to examine offers or bids on the spot
reduces flexibility, according to some.
Individual brokers do try to get the "feel" of the market, and
they adjust their actions accordingly. Indeed, a House subcommittee
found that some futures traders pay little attention to the factors of
supply and demand that theoretically shape market behavior. They
are influenced instead by the attitudes of other speculators; if the
belief develops in a pit that the market will go up, many traders
224. See FUTURES DATA REroRT, supra note 113, at xii, 3, 17-18, 32, 52, 58.
225. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310 (testimony of W. Vernon, III,
Executive Vice-President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.).
226. E.g., RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
ch. 4, ch. 9, § 259 (1973).
227. See 197J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70 (testimony of A. Donahoo,
Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Minneapolis, Minn.).
228. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 253 (testimony of A. Caldwell,
Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority).
229. See 197J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 128 (testimony of F. Uhlmann,
Chairman of the Board, Chicago Board of Trade); id. at 190 (testimony of M. Weinberg, Chairman of the Board, Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
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will buy, thus stimulating an artificial upward movement.230 Many
of these judgments are economically unsound, and of little benefit
either to the market or to the economy. Some subjective assessments
are valuable, but they could continue to play a role in a computerized system. Brokers would have to judge the market from a distance, but this should put a premium on ability to evaluate supply
and demand, government reports, and the many other elements that
shape market trends, rather than discouraging reliance on such
factors. 281
Of course, computerized markets would lack the color and excitement of a pit full of frantic traders. But the futures markets play
too important a role in our economy to ignore changes that may
increase their effectiveness. Computerization might help to restore
public confidence in markets that have been charged repeatedly
with fostering abusive practices. In addition, the use of computers
might aid in stabilizing prices and systematizing trades. These possibilities make at least the study of computerization immediately
important.232
V.

PROBLEMS

NoT

CONSIDERED IN THE

1974

LEGISLATION

Although the 1974 Act effects many major reforms, it fails to
provide the new Commission with the authority to deal with two
troublesome problems-the market distortions that may be caused
when foreigners make sizeable trades on American exchanges, and
the extent to which federal control should be exerted over margin
requirements. Perhaps it was felt that these issues were beyond the
scope of the Commission's regulatory powers.233 The discussion
below will examine the importance of these problems and assess the
role that the Commission could play in dealing with them.
230. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 59.
231. There would still be considerable advantages for brokers located near a
board of trade, where they would have ready access to other traders and could
keep close track of market movements. However, these advantages would be of less
importance than they are in the current system, and the gap benveen those trading
on the floor and those located elsewhere would be less conspicuous. See FUTURES DATA
REPORT, supra note 113, at 86.
232. See generally H:R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 59-60 (conclusion of
the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems, Permanent Select Comm. on Small
Business, favoring computerized trading). See also FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note
113, at 85-86. Paul Franklin, Vice-President and Director of Commodites of Merrill
Lynch, adds, "computerization is inevitable. If the Commission acts in an objective
and knowledgeable way, commodities trading can only benefit." Bus. WEEK, Dec. 21,
1974, at 145. See also UNCTAD SrooY, supra note 33, 11 42.
233. Many feel that the issue of export controls involves the country's over-all
agricultural policy, and not just the functioning of the futures markets. In contrast,
it has been argued that margin controls can best be dealt with at the exchange level,
rather than at the governmental level. See text at notes 263-315 infra.
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A. Export Controls
Few incidents involving the agricultural sector of the American
economy have occasioned as much popular criticism and alarm as
the so-called "Russian wheat deal" of 1973.234 The deal involved the
sale of huge amounts of grain to the Soviet Union, and helped to
drive wheat prices on futures markets to unprecedented levels,23 G
The concern over the wheat trade contributed to the increased
congressional interest in futures markets that led to the 1974 Act.236
Yet, the Act gives the Commission little authority to guard against
the disruptive effects that such foreign trades can have on American
futures markets.
The omission reflects, in part, a determination that the futures
markets were not solely responsible for whatever errors were made
in allowing the wheat deal to occur. Once the sale had been made,
much of the damage had already been done; the prices on the futures
markets simply reflected the new supply and demand situation on
the cash market. But the futures markets remain crucial to successful
negotiations between American companies and large foreign buyers
of American commodities.237 Moreover, the intent of Congress in
adopting the 1974 Act was to ensure "fair practice and honest dealing
on the commodity exchanges," and to provide "a measure of control
over those forms of speculative activity which often demoralize the
markets to the injury of producers, consumers, and the exchanges
themselves." 238 As will be demonstrated, without control over the
access of large foreign traders to American markets, or control of
American exporters that attempt to hedge large orders, the Commission often will be unable to pursue its mandate.
Large export transactions with foreign governments or companies pose two problems. The first is the potential for foreign
manipulation of American markets. Presently, foreign companies
and governments are as free as domestic traders to take speculative
positions on American futures markets. They are subject only to
the limits on speculation that are imposed by federal authorities on
American trading firms.239 However, unlike domestic traders, foreign traders may speculate indirectly, and thereby avoid these re234- For a general description of the chronology of this incident, and its impact,
J. TRAGER, AMBER WAVES OF GRAIN {1st ed. 1973).
235. See Bus. WEEK, Aug, 4, 1973, at 46; New York Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 58,
col. 1 (late city ed.),
236. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 21 (testimony of Dr. C. Ycuttcr,
Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Consumer Services, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture),
237. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 31-36.
238. S. REP. No. 93-1131, supra note 62, at 1.
239. For example, the maximum net long or net short position that any person
may hold in any one grain on any contract market is 2 million bushels, 7 U.S,C.
§ 6a (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 150 (1974).
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quirements, because federal authorities have inadequate information
to determine in advance whether the foreign customer really intends
to export all of the cash commodity he purchases, or whether he
intends to use it for speculation. Thus, a foreign country can buy
more of the cash commodity than it actually needs for its own consumption and hold the excess in American storage facilities until
the price has risen. It can then sell the excess on the cash market,
often at a price high enough to pay for the entire initial purchase.240
The cash price may drop, of course, but the foreign buyer can
hedge by taking a long position on the futures markets. When the
futures sellers discharge their obligation, little o~ the commodity
will be available on the cash market, so prices will have . risen
substantially.
·
Another, more complicated scheme allows large foreign traders
to profit from market distortions by taking a short rather than a long
position on the futures markets.241 A foreign company or country
could first purchase extra inventory of a commodity. After waiting
for the increase in futures prices that would reflect the shortage on
the cash market, it could hedge its inventory by selling short-that
is, by buying contracts to sell-at the prevailing high price. It
could then release its excess commodity for general sale, which
would drive futures prices down. Subsequent liquidation of its
short position would yield a substantial profit.
The consequences of such manipulation could be far more
serious than even the consequences of the Russian wheat deal.242
Congressman Neal Smith noted that
what happened is not the worst that can happen. There are other
• dangers lurking around the comer, and we ought to be thinking
about these things before they are upon us. One of them that apparently we really have not been giving enough attention to is the
possibility that some company, or some foreign country indirectly
through a company could really distort our grain market more than
all the other speculators we are worried about could possibly do.243
The Commission might request several powers that would
enable it to deal with these problems. An extreme proposal by an
official of one large export company would ban foreign governments
from hedging on American futures markets.244 The official argued
240. The House Small Business Subcommittee investigating futures markets estimated that a foreign party could take delivery of only one quarter of a big purchase
and make enough profit from the resale of the rest to pay for the grain that is
actually exported and consumed. H.R. REP. No. 93--963, supra note 142, at 35.
241. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 378.
242. See id. at 377.
243. Id.
244. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 178 (statement of W. Saunders, Group
Vice-President, Cargill, Inc., Washington, D.C.).
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that, since foreign governments supposedly acquire commodities
only for direct consumption, they should not need to hedge their
inventories. Foreign governments would then be subject to the
speculative trading limits on all of their transactions, and there
would be no possibility of massive price manipulation. While such
a solution would be easy to enforce, it would place foreign interests
at a significant disadvantage on American markets. The American
futures markets play a central role in the determination of world
prices in many commodities, and it is desirable to keep them as open
as possible. Before imposing such a stringent restriction on foreign
interests, the Congress and the Commission should explore less
onerous controls:
The Commission must be able to ensure that foreign parties
that trade on American futures markets will abide by the same
limitations that are imposed on domestic traders. One mild measure
would be to require that an FCM trading for a foreign party secure
from it a signed document stating that it is aware of the limits on
speculation and agrees to abide by them. 246 Such a document, however, would have little effect on those intent on avoiding the
restraints.
A more effective approach was suggested in an amendment to the
1974 Act proposed by Senator Clark of Iowa. Clark's amendment,
rejected by the Senate Agriculture Committee, would have required
that an FCM trading for a foreign party obtain from the party a
surety bond in an amount set by the Commission before any order
to purchase or sell a futures contract could be accepted. 246 The bond
would be forfeited to the United States if the foreign party failed to
submit to the jurisdiction of the American courts, the Commission,
or an exchange in an action to enforce the 1974 Act. The Commission would be free to waive the bond when a foreign trader's over-all
position fell below a fairly substantial dollar amount. If the bond
were sufficiently high, its requirement would assure the cooperation
of foreign parties with domestic trading regulations without seriously restricting their access to American markets.
The Clark proposal would in no way compromise the confidentiality that foreign traders desire. The bond would not even
have to be posted until after the completion of the cash transaction,
when the seller might need to hedge. Moreover, the FCM could execute the bond confidentially, so that others would not become aware
of the trader's speculative or hedging position. Foreign traders
would undoubtedly consider the bond requirement annoying, but if
245. Interview with Robert L. Radin, Vice-President, Paine, Webber, Jackson &:
Curtis, in Chicago, m., Nov. 7, 1974 (memorandum of conversation on file with the
Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter Radin Interview].
246. The proposed amendment was identical to S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(b)
(1974).
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they were taking a legitimate futures position, it would be only a
formality for them. The importance of securing adherence to
trading regulations, without endangering the ready accessibility of
American markets to foreign traders, should prompt the Commission to urge Congress to reconsider the Clark proposal.
Foreign manipulation of American markets is only one of the
dangers of noncontrolled large export trading. The second danger is
disguised speculation by foreign interests, which is made possible
by the hedging of American grain companies and exporters. When
a foreign country (perhaps represented by a large foreign company)
wants American wheat,247 it will usually contract to buy it at a fixed
price with one or more American grain export companies. The
export firms are willing to sell at a fixed price for future delivery
because they can hedge their sales on the futures markets248 by
buying futures contracts that mature at the same time the grain is
to be exported. There is no limit on the amount of futures that a
company may buy, as long as the purchases are for legitimate hedging.
The Russian wheat deal is illustrative. Once the original sales
contracts were made, participating American companies quickly
moved into the futures markets to cover their price position, and
into the cash market to contract for the actual grain. 249 They were
able to do so at prices that had not yet been affected by the news of
the Russian deal. As the extent of the sales became known, the value
of the wheat not already under contract increased, and both cash
and futures price levels rose dramatically. Those who were unaware
of the deal suffered the losses, while the participating grain companies profited.250
The attractiveness to foreign interests of agreements with American export firms is based in large part on the firms' willingness to
agree to fixed prices for future delivery. This willingness is possible
only because the firms can hedge their prices on the futures markets.
Even though the foreign party does not itself enter the futures market, and even though the price distortion is caused by hedging rather
than by speculation, the need for regulation in this area is clear.
Current efforts at control have been based on agricultural policy
considerations that transcend impact on the futures markets. While
the problem does go beyond the markets, it is imperative that the
Commission have an input into policy determinations in the export
area.
The most dramatic means of regulating foreign speculation
247. To simplify discussion, this section will refer only to wheat. Similar export
sales, of course, could be made in most commodities in which futures contracts are
traded.
248. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 31.
249. 197:J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 13 (testimony of Representative Smith).
250. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 35.
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would be to impose either rigid export controls, with quotas for
each nation that wants to buy American products, or floating export
controls, which vary each year with the size of the crops.21i1 The
foreign and domestic policy ramifications of such proposals are
beyond the scope of this note. The implication for the futures
markets would be to limit foreign interests to the amount of each
commodity needed for consumption. The controls would deter
foreign groups from leaving a portion of the commodities they
purchase in this country for later speculation. Furthermore, since
the maximum amount of each nation's purchase would be public
knowledge, each exporter would have a better idea of how much
foreign interests were buying from other companies. American
hedgers would thus be better apprised of the supply and demand
factors likely to influence futures prices.252
There has been considerable opposition to the establishment of
controls, from both private interests and public officials. Negotiations ben'leen foreign buyers and large American grain companies
are extremely delicate. The grain companies fear that a requirement
to report major agreements with foreign parties would dissuade
those parties from purchasing grain in this country.203 Agricultural
exports are an important source of balance of payments income,2 u4
and few wish to jeopardize them. However, the consequences of
market disruption or distortion, such as the· 1973 rise in price levels
caused in part by the Russian grain deal, are also grave. When markets are distorted by enormous foreign sales, many may demand that
the government impose controls by fiat, or close the futures markets
entirely.255 Such actions would wreak havoc with the free market
system and reduce foreign confidence in the ability of American
firms to honor their sales agreements.256
251. Floating export controls have been proposed by Robert L. Radin. Radin
Interview, supra note 245.
252. The Subcommittee on Special Small Business Problems of the House Select
Committee on Small Business concluded that the lack of knowledge by each export
firm of the extent of other Russian grain purchases, and the length of time before
the users of futures markets became aware of the dimensions of the deal, enabled the
Russians to buy at low price levels and thus to transfer much of the cost of the deal
to other traders. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 31-36.
253. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 605-06 (testimony of C.
Roberts, Jr., Vice-President, and R. Johnson, Manager, Public Affairs Department,
Cargill, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.).
254. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 127 (testimony of J.
Spicola, Group Vice-President, Cargill, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.). It has been estimated that foreign sales of American commodities alone total $21.3 billion. FoRill!S,
Dec. 15, 1974, at 66.
255. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 13 (statement of Representative
Smith).
256. In arguing against export controls, the President of the Chicago Board of
Trade points out that "[e]xport controls send false signals to producers and consumers. They are a disincentive to more production and an incentive for more con-

March 1975]

Notes

749

Reporting requirements offer a less drastic measure with which
to combat disguised speculation by foreign interests. The present
administration has shortened the period for voluntary reporting of
export sales three times since the Russian wheat deal.257 Despite the
objection of export firms that a reporting requirement soon after
sales would drive away their business,258 the administration has now
requested firms to report advance sales over a minimum size to the
Secretary of Agriculture.259 While insisting that the reports are
voluntary, the Secretary has indicated that lack of cooperation by
firms would result in mandatory controls.260 A major weakness of
this informal system is that it does not provide for prompt sharing
of trading information with the Commission. It is essential that the
Commission have access to such information, and that it have a
voice in deciding which foreign sales will be approved. Also, the
quality of information could be improved if Congress were to adopt
a measure similar to that proposed by Senator Clark to the Senate
Agriculture Committee in 1974. The Clark amendment would have
required export firms to report to the Commission the "initiation,
completion, or termination" of any negotiations with foreign
parties.261 Such a strict requirement, rejected by the Committee,
would have given federal authorities more time to study the effect
sumption." Because of recent ad hoc controls, he asserts, "[w]e are in danger of
losing valuable markets and foreign currency." FORBES, Dec. 15, 1974, at 66.
257. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 8 (late city ed.).
258. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 605-06 (testimony of C.
Roberts, Public Affairs Dept., Cargill, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.).
259. The current "volunteer'' plan asks grain companies to report in advance proposed sales of 50,000 or more tons of grain or soybeans, as well as cumulative sales
to one country that exceed 110,000 tons per week. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at 1,
col. 8 (late city ed.); id., Oct. 9, 1974, at 55, col. 8 (late city ed.).
260. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at I, col. 8 (late city ed.).
261. The text of the amendment, similar in intent to S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 209 (1974), is as follows:
Section 216: The Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, is amended by inserting the following new section immediately after Section 4g (7 U.S.C. 6g):
Section 4h. {a) Any person who negotiates to buy or sell goods, articles,
services, rights or interests which may have an extraordinary impact on the futures market from sellers or to buyers outside the United States, respectively,
which are the subject matter of a futures contract traded in the United States,
shall file an exporter-importer report with the Commission upon the initiation,
completion, or termination of any negotiations with a person outside the United
States relating to the purchase or sale of such goods, articles, services, rights or
interests. The reports shall contain such information and be filed in the form and
manner the Commission prescribes. The Commission may require any subsequent
reports under this section necessary to update the information in the exporterimporter report.
(b) The Commission shall, by rule, designate the amount of an import or
export which may have an ~traordinary impact on futures markets.
(c) The Commission shall obtain the information specified in subsection (a)
from other federal agencies to the extent it is available from them.
(d) Names of individual companies shall be confidential and no other information regarding the import or export may be made public until negotiations
are completed.
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on the market of large foreign trades, and greater flexibility in
deciding what measures to take to protect the futures markets. If
Commission officials did receive the information called for in the
Clark amendment, they could make a prompt announcement of
large sales to foreign interests. The time at which knowledge of
such sales is made public is crucial in terms of market impact. While
disclosure of negotiations prior to the completion of the contract
would make trading difficult, and should be prohibited, prompt
announcement of the sale would severely curtail the amount of
hedging that would be possible at low prices. Export firms probably
would respond by limiting the amount of physical commodities they
would be willing to sell for future delivery at fixed prices.
The failure to give the Commission authority to deal with the
impact of foreign sales on futures markets is a major flaw in the
1974 Act. At the very least, the Commission should have access to
the voluntary reports presently received by the Secretary of Agriculture. More importantly, the present system should be made
mandatory, and an amendment requiring reporting to the Commission should be enacted. In addition, the Commission's ability to
ensure stable markets would be increased if it were allowed to
make the reports public when it determines that disclosure would
be in the public interest.262
B.

Oversight of Margins

A "margin" is the amount that a trader buying a particular
contract is required to deposit with his futures commission merchant for ultimate deposit with the clearing house.283 It is similar to
an earnest money payment, which serves as an indication of the good
faith of the purchaser. Low margins are attractive to traders because
they can establish a larger market position ·with less capital. The
minimum amount of margin that is acceptable on each contract is
set as often as once a day by the exchange on which the contract is
bought, on the basis of the previous day's prices.284
Questions at the center of the debate over regulation of futures
markets have been whether the federal government should oversee
the setting of margins, and whether it should have the power to
change margins in certain emergency situations.20u The 1974 Act
See S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 209(d) (1974).
See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note II, at 62-65,
Id.
See, e.g., Hearings To Amend the Commodity Exchange Act Before the HollSe
Comm. on Agriculture, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter 1967 HollSe Hearings];
Hearings on the Anti-Inflation Program as Recommended in the President's Message
of November 17, 1947 Before the Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, '19th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1948).
262.
263.
264.
265.
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apparently denies the Commission any such authority,266 and thus
leaves the individual exchanges, in exclusive control of the setting of
margins.267 There are persuasive reasons why this approach is unwise and unworkable. This section will argue that Congress, swayed
by determined and vocal opposition to federal oversight of margins,268 overlooked several ways to delegate limited supervisory authority to the Commission without lessening the day-to-day freedom
of the exchanges to determine margin levels.
As noted above, a margin payment is a deposit, given by a trader
to his futures commission merchant as "earnest money." The exchanges establish a minimum acceptable margin, although the individual FCM may decide to require more in particular cases.269 The
deposit guarantees that the trader will fulfill his obligations under
the futures contract. Margins are especially important in the futures
market because most investors have no intention of buying the
actual commodity; they contract only to buy or to sell a specified
amount of the commodity at a certain time in the future.270 Since
the purpose of the margin is to assure the broker that he will be
able to liquidate the contract if the market moves adversely to it,
the broker may require an additional margin deposit if the market
price of the trader's contract falls.271 An additional deposit may also
be called for if the exchange alters the amount of margin required
on a particular contract.272 If a customer fails to meet a margin call,
the FCM will immediately liquidate his position; the customer ·will
be liable for any losses caused by a decline in the value of the con266. See Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 213, 88 Stat. 1404.
267. The act does grant the Commission emergency power to "direct the
market" whenever "an emergency exists," however, and the term "emergency" includes any "major market disturbance which prevents the market from accurately
reflecting the forces of supply and demand ••••" Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 215, 88 Stat.
1405. This provision arguably gives the Commission authority to determine margins
in rare situations.
268. See, e.g., 1973 House 'Hearings, supra note 50, at 93 (statement of H. Christopher, President, The Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.), id. at 109-11
(statement of R. Clark, representing the New York Coffee &: Sugar Exchange, Inc.), id.
at 146 (statement of W. Brooks, President, National Grain Trade Council, Washington, D.C.); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 287 (statement of C. Bradley,
President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.); id. at 336-37 (statement of L.
Melamed, Chairman, International Monetary Market, Chicago Mercantile Exchange);
id. at 392 (statement of Dr. R. Dahl, Professor, University of Minnesota); id. at 447-48
(statement of F. Rhodes, President, New York Cotton Exchange); id. at 493-94 (appendix to statement of C. Chapin, representing the New York Coffee &: Sugar Exchange,
Inc., the New York Cocoa Exchange, and The Commodity Exchange, Inc.); id. at
516-17 (statement of P. Franklin, Vice-President, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith).
269. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 62-65.
270. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 493.
271. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 17-18.
272. Id.
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tract prior to liquidation.278 Brokerage firms that are members of an
exchange's clearing house must keep the set minimum amount of
margin money on deposit at the clearing house.274 As described
earlier,275 the clearing house determines a settlement price for contracts each day, and members either receive or pay money to the
clearing house depending on whether they have a surplus or deficiency in their margin accounts. Normally, the initial margin adjustments will be a day's only margin transaction, but a member
may be asked to deposit additional margin on an hour's notice when
market prices move very rapidly.276
There has been great confusion over the effects of changes in
margin requirements during periods of large market fluctuation.
Two government statements that argued that the federal government should be given increased authority over margins gave dia•
metrically opposed reasons for their conclusions.277 In 1966 the
Department of Agriculture favored government authority to establish minimum margin requirements when "there is reason to believe
there is danger of price manipulation, or unreasonable sudden
price fluctuations or unwarranted changes in price, excessive speculation, or any other activity reasonably expected to restrain
trade." 278 An Assistant Secretary explained that, during some major
fluctuations, the raising of margins would help to prevent excessive
speculation.279 In contrast, the 1974 report of the House Small Business Subcommittee argued that federal oversight of margins was
needed to prevent the exchanges from raising margins unnecessarily
in times of market fluctuation. 280 They were concerned that exchanges might raise margins to benefit certain trading interests at
the expense of others. The report cited the complaints of legitimate hedgers who, during the 1973 rise in futures prices for soybeans
273. Id.
274. For more detail on clearing house operations, see CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE,
supra note 204, at 29-34; T. HmRoNYMus, supra note 11, at 40-43.
275. See text at notes 22-24 supra.
"'
276. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 42.
277. Compare 1967 House Hearings, supra note 265, at 10-32, with H.R. REP. No.
93-963, supra note 142, at 17-21.
278. 1967 House Hearings, supra note 265, at 12.
279. Id. He argued that raising margins could prevent excessive speculation by
retarding the buildup of large holdings of a particular futures contract by a small
number of people, or by reducing the amount of such holdings already in existence.
He pointed out that there were several instances in which e.xchange officials refused
to heed the requests of the Department that margins be raised substantially in order
to lessen excessive speculation. Id. at 29-30. The most noteworthy example occurred
in 1947, when the exchanges refused to comply with a request by the Commodity
Exchange Authority for higher margins that was intended to dampen soaring food
prices. President Truman directly criticized the exchanges on the radio and proposed
an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act that would have authorized him to
order compliance.
280. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 17-21.
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and com, had to incur substantial increases in costs simply to meet
margin calls.281 Many hedgers in fact were unable to meet the increased requirements and took losses on their contracts.282
Exchange officials point to such confusion as a reason why
margins must be set by the exchanges, which are familiar with daily
trading conditions, rather than by the govemment.283 They also
maintain that the only legitimate purpose of futures margins is to
protect FCM's from losses that could be caused by unsecured debit
balances in customers' accounts. 284 Accordingly, the exchanges argue
that federal supervision is unwarranted. They reject any analogy to
securities margins, which may be adjusted by the Federal Reserve
Board,285 because in contrast to the level of securities margins, the
level of futures margins is allegedly of little direct importance to
the rest of the economy.286 Margins should thus be set as low as
possible while still ensuring performance of contract commitments.287 Exchanges favor low margins because high margins force
hedgers to borrow more funds, and thereby to incur higher costs.
Since costs are passed along to consumers, the public has an interest
in low margin rates.28B
Many of these arguments are indisputable. The conclusion to
which they lead, however, may be challenged. Even accepting the:
assumption that the only function of margins is to protect FCM's, it
does not follow that federal authorities have no valid regulatory
objectives. Federal regulation seeks to ensure the existence of fair
and open markets in which investors can have confidence; credit
protection is surely an important part of this goal. Especially in
281. Id. at 19-21.
282. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 21.
283. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 318, 493-94.
284. See, e.g., id. at 318, 447, 493.
285. Securities margin levels determine the proportion between the amount that
is actually paid for securities and the amount that may be borrowed for their purchase. The Federal Reserve has authority to determine this proportion because margin
levels provide a device by which to control credit and money supply for the economy.
Because purchasers of futures contracts buy future obligations rather than shares
representing the ownership of actual assets, the exchanges argue that futures margin
changes have no effect on the nation's money supply. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra
note 37, at 493.
For comparisons of the functions of futures margins and securities margins, see
ECONOMIC R.E5EARCH SERVICE,

U.S.

DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, MARGINS, SPECULATION AND

PRICES IN GRAIN FUTURES MARKETS 157-73 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 MARGIN STUDY]; R.
TEWELES, C. HAiu.ow & H. STONE, supra note 6, at 14, 45-51; 1974 Senate Hearings,
supra, at 447 (testimony of F. Rhodes, President, New York Cotton Exchange); id. at
493 (appendix to statement of C. Chapin, representing the New York Coffee &: Sugar
Exchange, the New York Cocoa Exchange, and The Commodity Exchange, Inc.).
286. See note 285 supra.
287. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 414 (statement of A. Donahoo,
Executive Vice-President, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Minneapolis, Minn.).
288. See, e.g., id. at 447 (statement of F. Rhodes, President, New York ·cotton
Exchange); id. at 494 (appendix to statement of C. Chapin).
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times of high prices and volatile markets reflecting food shortages
and inflation,289 the risks created by inadequate safeguards on market
credit are great. Problems are most likely to arise on the smaller
exchanges, which occasionally attempt to attract business by setting
low margin levels. Federal regulatory authority is necessary to prevent dangerously low margins from leading to serious financial
losses for brokerage houses or even to the collapse of an exchange.
Federal oversight of margin requirements would also help to
control speculation. The exchanges argue against this proposition,200
citing a 1966 study of futures margins done for the Department of
Agriculture.291 They present the study as evidence that speculation
often moderates price volatility, and that raising margins in order
to reduce speculation will actually harm hedgers, without reducing
market movements.292
The results of the 1966 study are not nearly as conclusive as the
exchanges suggest. It is not clear that margin levels could not be
used to control speculation. In its final recommendations, the study
does suggest that federal interference in setting margin levels would
be unwise.293 This recommendation is based in part on evidence
that small increases in margin levels have tended to correspond with
increased market volatility.294 The study cautioned, however, that
the correlation may have occurred because the margin increases
were made when greater fluctuations were expected, or because
many brokers did not comply with the changes in margins, which
the exchanges were lax in enforcing. If the federal authorities had
enforced the margin changes, the study noted, the results might
have been different. 295 Furthermore, in the one instance when large
increases in margin requirements were made, there was a prompt
reduction in price fluctuations. 296 And, as the study points out, it
is only when major margin changes are needed that federal authorities are likely to intervene.297
In properly evaluating the study's recommendation against federal oversight of margins, it is important to remember that the study
289. See, e.g., Thackray, The Perilous Present for Commodity Futures, MONEY,
Aug. 1973, at 28; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1973, at 118; FORBES, Aug. l, 1973, at 25;
FORTUNE, July 1973, at 65; TIME, April 2, 1973, at 84.
290, See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 337 (testimony of L Melamed,
Chairman, International Money Market, Chicago Mercantile Exchange); id. at 493
(testimony of C. Chapin).
291. See 1967 MARGIN STUDY, supra note 285.
292. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 493 (appendix to statement of
C. Chapin).
293. 1967 l\:fARGIN SruoY, supra note 285, at 8.
294. Id. at 191-93.
295. Id. at 192-93.
296. Id. at 142-43.
297. Id. at 194.
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was addressing regulation by the Commodity Exchange Authority
as of 1966. The report concluded that prompt, accurate determinations of when to apply margin controls to moderate excessive price
fluctuations would require "highly sophisticated systems of market
data collection and tabulation ...." 298 Such systems were not available to the Authority in 1966. In light of the tremendous increase
in the amount and the sophistication of the data that ·will be available to the new Commission,299 the current import of the report
must be questioned. New, detailed studies of the impact of changes
in margins on controlling excessive speculation must be undertaken
before the Commis~ion is permanently deprived of regulatory authority in this area.
A final argument against federal oversight raised by the exchanges is that proper margins are so essential to the markets that
unwise federal intervention could "effectively destroy futures
trading ...." 300 Exchange officials should set margins, the argument
goes, because they are closest to the trading floor and their knowledge and experience makes them best able to weigh the interests
of the diverse groups affected by margin levels.301 Federal authorities
would be too remote to make quick and accurate decisions. 802
This argument ignores the potential conflicts of interest that
may arise if exchanges are free to set margin levels without federal
oversight. The boards of most exchanges are dominated by representatives of FCM's and floor traders,303 and it is the board that sets
margin levels. Because margin changes can be used to raise or lower
commodity prices,804 there may be a conflict between the public
responsibilities of exchange directors and their personal interests
in price movements. For this reason some have actually demanded
that federal authorities oversee all exchange margin decisions.305
The majority sentiment, however, would leave the day-to-day setting
of margin levels to the exchanges. Thus, most recent legislative
298. Id. at 9.
299. See, e.g., FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113.
300. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 493 (testimony of C. Chapin, representing the New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, the New York Cocoa Exchange, and
The Commodity Exchange, Inc.).
301. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70 (testimony of A. Donahoo,
Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange); id. at 93 (testimony of H. Christopher,
President, The Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.); House Small Business
Hearings, supra note 38, at 162-63 (testimony of F. Uhlmann, Chairman, Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago).
302, See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 453, 493-94.
303. Interview with Edward De Moch, Commodity Market Specialist, Associated
Press, in Chicago, July 26, 1973. See also note 159 supra.
304. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 339 (testimony of L. Melamed,
Chairman, International Monetary Market, Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
305. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 21; 1974 Senate Hearings,
supra note 37, at 208-09 (testimony of Representative Smith).
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proposals have given federal authorities only minimal oversight
functions. 306
There are some steps that federal authorities might take to
guarantee adequate margins that would not involve federal determination of margin amounts. One such measure would change the
manner in which clearing members' margin deposits with the exchange clearing houses are computed. Currently, initial margin
deposits are requested of clearing members only for their net long
or short position in a commodity.BOT Thus, a clearing member firm
that has both a short position-for the sale of 50 May com futures
contracts-and a long position-for the purchase of 100 May com
contracts-would be required to deposit margin money only on its
net long position of 50 May com futures contracts. Since the firm
will be owed margin money from both its long and its short customers, but need pay only on its net position, it may be la.'{ in
determining the reliability of its customers and in requiring them
to keep minimum margin amounts on hand.Bos Because of this practice, firms will often wait some time before liquidating the contracts of a delinquent customer who has lost on the market.
A preferable system would require clearing members to deposit
margins on both their long and short positions with the clearing
house. Such a requirement would encourage greater caution on the
part of FCM's in dealing with their customers,Boo especially in this
period of high prices and costly market fluctuations.B 10 To minimize
federal intrusion, the authority to tighten margin requirements in
this manner might be made discretionary rather than mandatory.
Another way for the Commission to supervise margin levels
without interfering directly in their determination would be to
develop a general margin formula. Some have suggested that careful
study would reveal that safe margin levels are functions of prices
and trading conditions.B11 The Commission, in cooperation with the
exchanges, could develop margin tables that would specify acceptable
margin spreads according to price level, price volatility, trading
306. See, e.g., H.R. 11788, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1966); S. 2578, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 11 (1973); S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1973). See also 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 453.
307. See CmCAGO 130ARD OF TRADE, supra note 204, at 31.
308. Radin Interview, supra note 245.
309. Radin Interview, supra note 245. Radin also noted that such a system would
prevent the possibility of an account executive or back office employee hiding his
own transactions against the company's net position. Id. See also Wall St. J., Oct. 23,
1974, at 9, col. 2 (midwest ed.).
310. See materials cited note 289 supra.
311. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 48-49 (testimony of R,
Richards, representing the National Grain &: Feed Association); id. at 76 (testimony
of A. Donahoo, Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange); Interim Report of the Comp•
troller General on Commodity Futures Trading, May 3, 1974, in 1974 Senate Hear•
ings, supra note 37, at 1~9.
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volume, and other significant factors. 312 Such tables need not be
binding on the exchanges, and particular conditions might require
deviations from them. However, they would provide a general guide
that could at least help hedgers anticipate their margin costs and
signal authorities as to unusual margin requirements.
In addition to these measures, the Commission should request
authority to intervene in margin determination in times of unusual
market stress or volatility.313 The mere possibility of action by federal regulators will encourage exchanges to cooperate with federal
regulators and to maintain adequate credit safeguards. Although
exchange officials have argued that federal regulators might use
such authority unnecessarily,314 this argument has little merit. The
1974 Act expressly provides that the new Commissioners shall include persons knowledgeable about futures trading. 315 It seems
unlikely that such individuals would use their authority without
reason.

VJ. CONCLUSION
When legislation is enacted that delegates difficult decisions to
a regulatory body, its ultimate success depends on that body's interpretation of its mandate. Such is the case with the 1974 Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act. The choices before the Commission are not easy. While its first task must be to gather better
and more complete information, at some point the Commission
must make use of its new decision-making authority. If the Commissioners choose to rely on the familiar industry shibboleths of
futures regulation, their increased authority will mean little. If,
instead, they take a fresh approach, they may be plagued by their
lack of authority in some areas. Their· effectiveness will depend on
their skill in exploring new alternatives, both in those areas opened
to them by the new Act and in those still not within their power.
312. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 48.
313. It has been suggested that federal authorities should intervene in settiiig
margin levels only when there are particular proble.ms to be solved, and when radical
changes in margin setting procedure or margin levels are necessary. 1967 MARGIN
STUDY, supra note 285, at 193-94.
314. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 453 (testimony of F. Rhodes,
President, New York Cotton Exchange).
315. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 101, 88 Stat. 1389.

